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On Pareto-Eﬃciency and the No-Envy
Concept of Equity¤
1 Introduction
In dividing some ﬁxed amount of resources among a ﬁxed number of individuals, the
exclusive reliance on the Pareto-eﬃciency criterion will be of little help, since too many
feasible divisions will be Pareto-eﬃcient under the standard environmental conditions.
The introduction of an additional criterion of equity to the eﬀect that a division is eq-
uitable if and only if no individual envies the position of another individual when the
speciﬁed division is implemented will substantially narrow down the range of eligible
divisions.1 But the joint use of the Pareto-eﬃciency and the no-envy concept of equity
encounters diﬃculty when the amount to be divided depends upon the contribution made
by individuals, among whom ability diﬀerential prevails, since there may then be no eli-
gible division even under the standard environmental conditions.2 One possible response
to this dilemma would be to observe that, from the viewpoint of moral philosophy, it is
not altogether clear whether a concept of equity based on envy can be ethically relevant
in the ﬁrst place and to wash one’s hands of the business. The second and arguably more
“fruitful” response would be to propose a modiﬁed deﬁnition of equity which, coupled
with the Pareto-eﬃciency, provides us with an alternative deﬁnition of eligibility. In the
literature, we have abundantly many proposals to this eﬀect: wealth-fairness (Varian [20;
21]), income-fairness (Varian [20] and Pazner [9]), balanced-with-respect-to-envy-justice
(Daniel [5]), egalitarian-equivalence (Pazner and Schmeidler [11]) and fairness-equivalence
¤First published in Journal of Economic Theory, Vol.25, 1981, pp.367-379. This chapter was written
while I was visiting Stanford University in 1979-1980. I am deeply indebted to Professors Kenneth Arrow,
Peter Coughlin, Peter Hammond, Steve Goldman, and David Starrett for their helpful comments on an
earlier draft. Thanks are also due to the anonymous referees of Journal of Economic Theory, whose
incisive comments and remarks were instrumental in preparing the present version. Needless to say, I
am solely responsible for any defects which may still remain.
1This concept of equity is due originally to Foley [7, Sect. IV]. See also Pazner and Schmeidler [10]
and Varian [20].
2This dilemma was ﬁrst exposed by Pazner and Schmeidler [10].
1(Pazner [9]).3 The third response would be to imbed the proposed concept of fairness as
equity-cum-eﬃciency into the conceptual framework of social choice theory with a view
of evaluating how the identiﬁed diﬃculty would be located in the perennial enigma of
designing “satisfactory” collective choice mechanisms. The present paper is an attempt
in this third category of exercises which are related to equity, envy and eﬃciency. We
work with a model of social choice along the line of Arrow [3, Chap. VIII, Sect. IV. 4],
Sen [16, Chap. 9¤] and Suppes [18], in which the aggregation problem is to map each
proﬁle of individuals’ extended orderings of X £ N into a choice function on the family
of subsets of X, where X and N denote the set of social states and the set of individuals,
respectively. In this set-up, the viability of Foley’s [7] original deﬁnition of fairness will
be critically examined.
2 Fairness-as-No-Envy-cum-Eﬃciency and a Gener-
alized Collective Choice Rule
2.1. As Varian [21, p.240] has aptly observed, “[t]he theory of fairness ... is founded in the
notion of ‘extended sympathy’ and in the idea of ‘symmetry’ in the treatment of agents.
... In eﬀect, we are asking each agent to put himself in the position of each other agents to
determine if that is a better or a worse position than the one he is now in.” To formalize
this foundation of the theory of fairness, let X and N = f1;2;:::;ng(2 · n < +1)
stand, respectively, for the set of all conceivable social states and the set of individuals,
a social state being the complete description of the relevant aspects of the world. For
each i 2 N, we describe his/her views on the society by an extended preference ordering
e Ri on the Cartesian product X £ N,
((x;j);(y;k)) 2 e Ri
denoting the fact that being in the position of individual j in the social state x is at least
as good as being in the position of individual k in the social state y according to i’s view.4
A list of extended preference orderings, one ordering for each individual, will be called
a proﬁle and alternative proﬁles will be indexed by ®;¯;::: like ® = (e R®
1; e R®
2;:::; e R®
n),
¯ = (e R
¯
1; e R
¯
2;:::; e R¯
n) and so on. The set of all logically possible proﬁles will be denoted
by A , while the set of all non-empty ﬁnite subsets of X will be written as S, each and
every S 2 S being construed to represent a set of available states under the speciﬁed
environmental conditions.
2.2. Take a proﬁle ® = (e R®
1; e R®
2::::; e R®
n) 2 A and S 2 S and ﬁx them for the time
being. For each individual i 2 N, let i’s subjective preference ordering R®
i be deﬁned by
R
®
i = f(x;y) 2 X £ X j ((x;i);(y;i)) 2 e R
®
i g; (1)
3These proposals were succinctly surveyed and critically evaluated by Pazner [9] and Sen [17, Sect.
5].
4Being an ordering, e Ri is connected, reﬂexive and transitive binary relation on X £ N.
2in terms of which the ®-Paretian quasi-ordering R®
N will be deﬁned by
R
®
N = \i2NR
®
i : (2)
The set of all ®-Pareto-eﬃcient states in S will then be denoted as follows:
E
®
f (S) = fx 2 S j» [9y 2 S : (y;x) 2 P(R
®
N)]g; (3)
where and hereafter P(¢) will denote an operator giving the asymmetric part of the binary
relation in the parenthesis and » denotes logical negation.
Following Foley’s [7] classical deﬁnition, we say that individual i 2 N envies individual
j 2 N at x 2 X when the proﬁle ® prevails if and only if ((x;j);(x;i)) 2 P(e R®
i ) holds
true. We say that x is ®-equitable if and only if nobody envies other individuals at x
when the proﬁle ® prevails. The set of all ®-equitable states in S 2 S may be written
as follows:
E
®
q (S) = fx 2 S j 8i;j 2 N : ((x;i);(x;j)) 2 e R
®
i g: (4)
If a state in S is simultaneously ®-Pareto-eﬃcient and ®-equitable, it is said to be ®-fair
in S. The set of all ®-fair states in S, to be called the ®-fair set in S, will be denoted by
F
®(S) = E
®
f (S) \ E
®
q (S): (5)
2.3. The ﬁrst point to be clariﬁed about the ®-fair set in S is that it may well be
empty. Indeed, it is even possible that E®
q (X) = ? for some ® 2 A , namely, there
may exist no ®-equitable state wheresoever. Even if ®-Pareto-eﬃciency and ®-equity are
individually self-consistent (in the sense that they may respectively be satisﬁed), they
may well be jointly incompatible as is easily exempliﬁed as follows.
EXAMPLE 1. Let X = fx;yg and N = f1;2g. Let a proﬁle ® be speciﬁed by
e R®
1 : (y;2);(y;1);(x;1);(x;2);
e R®
2 : (y;2);(y;1);(x;2);(x;1):5
Clearly E®
q (fx;yg) = fxg and P(R®
N) = f(y;x)g, so that we have F ®(fx;yg) = ?.
Simple though this example is, it may serve us well to expose several important
features of the ®-fairness concept. As an auxiliary step, let R®
ij be deﬁned by
R
®
ij = f(x;y) 2 X £ X j ((x;j);(y;j)) 2 e R
®
i g: (6)
Clearly it is true that R®
i = R®
ii for all ® 2 A and all i 2 N. Notice that (x;y) 2 R®
i
means that individual i thinks that x is no worse for him than y, while (x;y) 2 R®
ij
means that i thinks that it is no worse for j to be in x rather than in y. With this
interpretation of R®
i and R®
ij, it seems fairly natural in the context where we talk about
5Preference orderings will be written horizontally with more preferred state-individual combination
to the left of less preferred, indiﬀerent combinations (if any) being put together by square brackets.
3the welfare judgements based on the extended sympathy that we require the fulﬁllment
of the following axiom, which is due to Sen [16, p. 156].6
AXIOM OF IDENTITY.
8i;j 2 N : R
®
ij = R
®
j :
It is well recognized that the lack of the sympathetic acceptance of other’s subjective
preferences, namely, the invalidity of the axiom of identity, causes many logical diﬃculty
in the exercise of aggregating proﬁles of extended preference orderings.7 Notice, however,
that the proﬁle speciﬁed in the Example 1 does satisfy the axiom of identity, so that the
problem identiﬁed by this example emerges even if the sympathetic identiﬁcation prevails
among individuals.
Our second remark on the ®-fairness concept concerns with the contrast between the
justice concept thereby implied and the traditional rival justice concepts, i.e., the Rawl-
sian leximin justice and the Benthamite utilitarian justice. Notice that in the situation
speciﬁed by the Example 1 both a Rawlsian and a Benthamite would assert that y is
more just than x — assuming for the sake of gaining comparability that 1 and 2 have in-
terpersonally fully comparable cardinal representation of e R®
1 and e R®
2, respectively, while
E®
q (fx;yg) = fxg would force one to say that x is more equitable than y. The ethical
appeal of the fairness-as-no-envy approach seems to be rather fragile indeed.
3 On the Possibility of Foley-Fair Collective Choice
Rules
3.1. Our problem is to design a “fair” generalized collective choice rule ª, GCCR for
short, which amalgamates each proﬁle ® 2 A of extended preference orderings into a
social choice function C® = ª(®) on S such that, for each set S 2 S of available social
states, C®(S) denotes the non-empty set of chosen states reﬂecting a “fair” amalgamation
of ® we have started from. In view of the possible non-existence of ®-fair states for some
® 2 A , care should be taken with the sense in which we mean a GCCR to be “fair”. One
sense which naturally suggests itself is to require that ª satisﬁes the following condition.
FAIRNESS EXTENSION (FE). For each admissible proﬁle ®, C® = ª(®) satisﬁes
F ®(S) = C®(S) whenever S 2 S is such that F ®(S) 6= ?.
3.2. Collective choice is a repeated exercise in changing environments and one
naturally feels that successive choices made should satisfy some “reasonable” choice-
consistency condition. A choice-consistency condition which is deeply rooted in the
6What the axiom of identity requires is that “placing oneself in the position of the other should
involve not merely having the latter’s objective circumstances but also identifying oneself with the other
in terms of his subjective features” (Sen [16, pp.149-150]). It is debatable, however, if indeed we need
literal transformation of subjective features so as to comply with the requirement of the axiom. On this
and related points, the interested readers are referred to Suzumura [19].
7See, for example, Sen [16, pp.149-150] and Suzumura [19].
4Arrovian social choice theory is that of collective full-rationality (FR), which requires
that we may construe a choice function C to describe a behaviour of optimizing fully
consistent collective preference relation. Formally C satisﬁes the condition FR if and
only if there exists a preference ordering RC on X satisfying
8S 2 S : C(S) = fx 2 S j 8y 2 S : (x;y) 2 RCg:
It was shown by Arrow [2] that a choice function C on S satisﬁes this condition FR
if and only if C satisﬁes the following axiom.
ARROW’S AXIOM (AA).
8S1;S2 2 S : S1 ½ S2 ) [S1 \ C(S2) = ? _ S1 \ C(S2) = C(S1)]:
The following two axioms, which were found useful in various social and individual
choice contexts, provide a natural decomposition of Arrow’s axiom.
CHERNOFF’S AXIOM (CA).
8S1;S2 2 S : S1 ½ S2 ) [S1 \ C(S2) = ? _ S1 \ C(S2) ½ C(S1)]:
DUAL-CHERNOFF AXIOM (DCA).
8S1;S2 2 S : S1 ½ S2 ) [S1 \ C(S2) = ? _ S1 \ C(S2) ¾ C(S1)]:
Another class of important choice-consistency conditions is that of path-independence,
due originally to Arrow [3, Chap. VIII, Sect. V] and Plott [12], and various variants
thereof. They essentially require that the choice from a set should be independent of the
path to be followed en route in search for the global choice.
PATH-INDEPENDENCE (PI).
8S1;S2 2 S : C(S1 [ S2) = C(C(S1) [ S2):
WEAK PATH-INDEPENDENCE ® (WPI(®)).
8S1;S2 2 S : C(S1 [ S2) ½ C(C(S1) [ S2):
WEAK-PATH-INDEPENDENCE ¯ (WPI(¯)).
8S1;S2 2 S : C(S1 [ S2) ¾ C(C(S1) [ S2):
Finally we introduce two very weak choice-consistency conditions which still have
bites.
SUPERSET AXIOM (SUA).
8S1;S2 2 S : [S1 ½ S2 &C(S2) ½ C(S1)] ) C(S1) = C(S2):
5STABILITY AXIOM (ST).
8S 2 S : C(C(S)) = C(S):
To facilitate recollection and later reference, we summarize the logical relationship
which holds true among these choice-consistency axioms in the following theorem, where
an arrow indicates a logical implication which cannot be reversed in general, while the
axioms in square brackets are equivalent to the axiom above them.
THEOREM 1.
FR
[AA=CA+DCA]
PI
[WPI(®)+WPI(¯)]
CA DCA
WPI(¯)
SUA
WPI(®)
ST
Proof. Most of the assertions being either immediate results of the deﬁnitions or
already established in Blair et al. [4], Ferejohn and Grether [6] and Plott [12], we have
only to prove that (a) DCA implies WPI (¯), and (b) WPI(¯) implies SUA.
(a) Assume that C satisﬁes the condition DCA on S and take any S1;S2 2 S. Since
C(S1) [ S2 ½ S1 [ S2 is obviously true, we may invoke DCA to assert that either
C(S1 [ S2) \ [C(S1) [ S2] = ?; (7)
or
C(S1 [ S2) \ [C(S1) [ S2] ¾ C(C(S1) [ S2) (8)
is true. If (8) is indeed the case, we have C(S1 [ S2) ¾ C(C(S1) [ S2) and we are home.
Assume therefore that (7) is true. Since S1 ½ S1 [ S2 is true, the second use of DCA
yields either
C(S1 [ S2) \ S1 = ?; (9)
or
C(S1 [ S2) \ S1 ¾ C(S1): (10)
It follows from (7) that C(S1 [ S2) \ C(S1) = C(S1 [ S2) \ S2 = ?, so that we obtain
C(S1 [ S2) ½ S1nC(S1); (11)
6which negates the validity of (9). Therefore (10) must be true, which however contradicts
(11). This concludes our proof of (a).
(b) Assume that C satisﬁes WPI(¯) and let S1;S2 2 S be such that S1 ½ S2 and
C(S2) ½ C(S1). Thanks to WPI(¯) we then have
C(S2) = C(S1 [ S2) ¾ C(C(S2) [ S1) = C(S1);
which, coupled with C(S2) ½ C(S1), yields C(S1) = C(S2), as desired.
Notice that these choice-consistency axioms are properties of a choice function but
they may be regarded as properties of a generalized collective choice rule which generates
a choice function having the designated properties. With this understanding in mind we
will talk about choice-consistency of a GCCR in the following.
3.3. Let us introduce a rather mild unrestricted domain condition on ª, which
requires that the class of admissible proﬁles be rich enough to the following extent.
UNRESTRICTED DOMAIN UNDER THE AXIOM OF IDENTITY (UID). The
domain of ª consists of all logically possible proﬁles satisfying the axiom of identity.
We are now ready to present our ﬁrst negative theorem on the “fair” GCCRs.
THEOREM 2. Suppose that there exist at least three social states. Then there exists
no GCCR which satisﬁes UID (Unrestricted Domain under the Axiom of Identity), FE
(Fairness Extension), and SUA (Superset Axiom of Choice-Consistency).
Proof. Take three distinct social states x, y, and z and let S1 = fx;yg and S2 =
fx;y;zg. Let a proﬁle ® = (e R®
1; e R®
2;:::; e R®
n) be such that
e R®
1(S2 £ f1;2g) : (x;1);(z;2);(z;1);(y;1);(y;2);(x;2);
e R®
2(S2 £ f1;2g) : (z;2);(y;2);(x;2);(x;1);(z;1);(y;1);
8i 2 Nnf1;2g : e R®
i (S2 £ f1;2g) = e R®
1(S2 £ f1;2g),
where e R®
j (S2£f1;2g) denotes the restriction of e R®
j on S2£f1;2g for all j 2 N, and that
8(v;j) 2 (X £ N)n(S2 £ f1;2g) :
8
> <
> :
((x;2);(v;j)) 2 P(e R®
1);
((y;1);(v;j)) 2 P(e R®
2);
8i 2 Nnf1;2g : ((v;j);(x;1)) 2 P(e R®
i );
8i 2 N;8(v
1;j
1);(v
2;j
2) 2 (X £ N)n(S2 £ f1;2g) :
((v
1;j
1);(v
2;j
2)) 2 I(e R
®
i )
7It is clearly the case that this proﬁle satisﬁes the axiom of identity. Notice that E®
q (S2) =
fx;yg and P(R®
N)\(S2£S2) = f(z;y)g. Therefore C®(S1) = F ®(S1) = S1 and C®(S2) =
F ®(S2) = fxg, where use is made of the condition FE. We then obtain S1 ½ S2;C®(S2) ½
C®(S1) and C®(S1) 6= C®(S2). Therefore a GCCR satisfying UID and FE cannot possibly
satisfy SUA.
3.4. The condition FE demands that the fair state and only the fair state should be
chosen when one exists. What if there exists no fair state? To consider this situation,
let us deﬁne an auxiliary relation R®
E on X for each ® 2 A by
R
®
E = f(x;y) 2 X £ X j x 2 E
®
q (X)&y = 2 E
®
q (X)g: (12)
Now if we really care about the appeal of equity-as-no-envy as well as Pareto-eﬃciency,
the following requirement may seem to be reasonable, which says basically that a state
which is either “more equitable” or “more eﬃcient” than a state which is chosen should
itself be among chosen states.
Fairness Inclusion (FI). If ® 2 A and S 2 S are such that F ®(S) = ?, then
(a) [x 2 S;(x;y) 2 R®
E &y 2 C®(S)] ) x 2 C®(S), and
(b) [x 2 S;(x;y) 2 P(R®
N)&y 2 C®(S)] ) x 2 C®(S), where C® = ª(®).
We also introduce a variant of the Pareto unanimity requirement on a GCCR, but
we need careful step forward in this slippery area. To require the exclusion of a state
y from a choice set for a binary choice environment fx;yg just because x happens to
Pareto-dominate y would be grossly inappropriate in the context where we care about
equity and the like, since doing so means to empower the Pareto-dominance relation to
always outweigh the equity consideration in the binary choice situation. But this lopsided
sanctiﬁcation of the Pareto dominance quite simply contradicts the emphasis put on the
equity consideration in the fairness approach. This argument, if accepted, would lead us
to the following conditional variant of the Pareto rule.
CONDITIONAL BINARY EXCLUSION PARETO (CBEP). If an admissible proﬁle
® and x;y 2 X are such that E®
q (fx;yg) = ? and (x;y) 2 \i2NP(R®
i ), then fxg =
C®(fx;yg), where C® = ª(®).
What emerges out of these mild-looking conditions on a GCCR is another impossi-
bility theorem, which reads as follows.
THEOREM 3. Suppose that there exist at least three social states. Then there exists
no GCCR which satisﬁes UID (Unrestricted Domain under the Axiom of Identity), FI
(Fairness Inclusion), CBEP (Conditional Binary Exclusion Pareto), and CA (Chernoﬀ’s
Axiom of Choice-Consistency).
Proof. Take three distinct social states x, y, and z and let S1 = fx;yg and S2 =
fx;y;zg. Let a proﬁle ® = (e R®
1; e R®
2;:::; e R®
n) be such that
8e R®
1(S2 £ f1;2g) : (x;2);(x;1);(y;2);(y;1);(z;1);(z;2);
e R®
2(S2 £ f1;2g) : (x;1);(x;2);(y;1);(y;2);(z;2);(z;1);
8i 2 Nnf1;2g : e R®
i (S2 £ f1;2g) = e R®
1(S2 £ f1;2g);
where e R®
j (S2 £ f1;2g) = e R®
j \ [(S2 £ f1;2g) £ (S2 £ f1;2g)] for all j 2 N, and that
8(v;j) 2 (X £ N)n(S2 £ f1;2g) :
8
> <
> :
((z;2);(v;j)) 2 P(e R®
1);
((z;1);(v;j)) 2 P(e R®
2);
8i 2 Nnf1;2g : ((v;j);(x;2)) 2 P(e R®
i );
8i 2 N;8(v
1;j
1);(v
2;j
2) 2 (X £ N)n(S2 £ f1;2g) :
((v
1;j
1);(v
2;j
2)) 2 I(e R
®
i )
It is easy to verify that this proﬁle satisﬁes the axiom of identity. Note that E®
q (S2) = fzg
and P(R®
N) \ (S2 £ S2) = f(x;y);(y;z);(x;z)g, so that we have C®(S1) = fxg by virtue
of CBEP. Consider now C®(S2). If x or y belongs to C®(S2), then z 2 C®(S2) by virtue
of FI(a). If z 2 C®(S2), then x as well as y belongs to C®(S2) thanks to FI(b). C®(S2)
being non-empty, we should then conclude that C®(S2) = S2. Then we have S1 ½ S2,
S1 \ C®(S2) = fx;yg 6½ C®(S1) = fxg, which implies that a GCCR satisfying UID, FI
and CBEP cannot possibly satisfy CA.
3.5. Several remarks seem to be in order here.
Firstly let us point out that there exists a concrete example of fairness-extending as
well as fairness-including GCCR which is due essentially to Goldman and Sussangkarn
[8]. For any proﬁle ® 2 A and any S 2 S, let a binary relation R® on X be deﬁned by
R® = P(R®
N)[R®
E and let R®(S) stand for the restriction of R® on S : R®(S) = R® \ (S£
S). We then deﬁne a choice set C®
GS(S) for S by
C
®
GS(S) = fx 2 S j 8y 2 S : (x;y) 2 T(R
®(S)) _ (y;x) = 2 T(R
®(S))g; (13)
where T(R®(S)) denotes the transitive closure of R®(S). Associating the well-deﬁned
choice function C®
GS on S thereby constructed with the proﬁle ® we have started from,
we have a complete description of a GCCR ªGS : ªGS(®) = C®
GS for all ® 2 A . It
is easy, if tedious, to show that ªGS satisﬁes the condition FE as well as the condition
FI for all ® 2 A . Thanks to Theoerem 2 we can assert without further ado that ªGS
cannot possibly satisfy the superset axiom of choice-consistency. We may also prove that
ªGS fails to satisfy Chernoﬀ’s axiom of choice-consistency as well, but it does satisfy the
stability axiom, although the latter property may presumably be too weak to celebrate
ªGS for its success in this arena. The power of Theorem 2 is such that it asserts by one
stroke that we cannot possibly improve the performance of ªGS unless we renounce the
wide applicability of our GCCR or the nice choice-consistency property thereof.
9Secondly we may assert the following simple corollaries of Theorems 1, 2, and 3. In
view of the strong intuitive appeal of path-independence argument, these corollaries may
better crystallize the logical diﬃculty identiﬁed by Theorems 2 and 3.
Corollary 1. Suppose that there exist at least three social states. Then there exists
no GCCR which satisﬁes UID (Unrestricted Domain under the Axiom of Identity), FE
(Fairness Extension) and WPI(¯)(Weak Path-Independence ¯).
Corollary 2. Suppose that there exist at least three social states. Then there exists
no GCCR which satisﬁes UID (Unrestricted Domain under the Axiom of Identity), FI
(Fairness Inclusion), CBEP (Conditional Binary Exclusion Pareto) and WPI(®) (Weak
Path-Independence ®).
Thirdly we should note that Theorem 2 as well as Theorem 3 does not invoke any
interproﬁle independence condition, which has often been nominated as the culprit of
Arrovian impossibility theorems. Indeed, only a single proﬁle is made eﬀective use of in
proving Theorems 2 and 3, respectively, so that the proﬁles richness condition UID is
in fact much stronger than is needed.8 Instead of requiring UID we may do throughout
with the following states richness condition suggested by Pollak [13] and Roberts [15],
which is the single-proﬁle analogue of the multiple-proﬁle requirement UID. Let ® 2 A
denote the given ﬁxed proﬁle.
States Richness Condition (SRC). Let ¯(S0) denote any logically possible sub-proﬁle
over the hypothetical triple set S0. Then there exists a one-to-one correspondence °¯ from
S0 into X such that
((°¯(x);i); (°¯(y);j)) 2 e R
®
k $ ((x;i);(y;j)) 2 e R
¯
k
for all x;y 2 S0 for all i;j;k 2 N.9
It should be clear that the condition SRC, which essentially requires that the set of
states X is rich enough, may replace the condition UID, which is the requirement to
the eﬀect that the set of proﬁles A is rich enough, to generate single-proﬁle analogue of
Theorems 2 and 3 and Corollaries 1 and 2.
4 Concluding Remarks
It is hoped that our results reported in this paper, which are largely negative, will help
clarify the nature and potentiality of the fairness-as-no-envy approach in the theory of
fairness and justice. In concluding this chapter, a few remarks are due.
(a) According to Varian [20, p.65], “[s]ocial decision theory asks for too much out of
the [preference aggregation] process in that it asks for an entire ordering of the various
8In this respect, our Theorem 2 and Theorem 3 are similar in nature to Sen’s [16, Chap. 6¤] impos-
sibility of a Paretian liberal.
9More explicitly, ¯(S0) = (e R
¯
1(S0 £ N); e R
¯
2(S0 £ N);:::; e R¯
n(S0 £ N)).
10social states... . The original question asked only for a good allocation; there was no
requirement to rank all allocations. The fairness criterion in fact limits itself to answering
the original question. It is limited in that it gives no indication of the merits of two
nonfair allocations, but by restricting itself in this way it allows for a reasonable solution
to the original problem.” This contrast between “social decision theory” and “fairness
criterion” is no doubt a useful one, but it seems to us that the two approaches may well
be subsumed in a more general choice-functional collective choice framework. In doing
so, we may enrich our understanding of one theory in the light of the implications of the
other theory on the common ground and vice versa. This is precisely the kind of exercise
we tried to perform in this chapter.
(b) It is often suggested that the prime virtue of the theory of fairness is that it requires
no such things as externally imposed interpersonal welfare comparisons, hypothetical
welfare functions, or ﬁctitious original position. Notice that our analysis of the concept
of fairness in the framework of social choice theory fully retains this alleged prime virtue
of the theory of fairness. One may even claim, following Alchian [1], that what is involved
in our GCCR framework is not an interpersonal welfare comparison but an intrapersonal,
intersituational comparison.
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13Chapter 6
The Informational Basis of the Theory of
Fair Allocation¤
1 Introduction
The theory of fair allocation studies allocation rules which select, for every economy
in a given class, a subset of feasible allocations on the basis of eﬃciency and fairness
properties. It was initiated by Foley [14], Kolm [16] and Varian [31] among others, who
focussed on the concept of no-envy. Since then it has been extended to cover many other
notions of fairness and a great variety of economic contexts (production, public goods,
etc.) by many authors.1 This theory contains some negative results, because it is usually
impossible to ﬁnd solutions which satisfy all conceivable requirements of eﬃciency and
equity simultaneously, but its hallmark is a richness of positive results. By now, not only
are there many interesting allocation rules uncovered in the literature, but also they are
fully characterized as the only rules satisfying some sets of reasonable axioms.
Compared to the theory of social choice, this makes a great contrast. In social choice
theory, Arrow’s impossibility theorem has been shown to remain valid in most economic
or abstract contexts. This theorem, like all the theory of social choice, is about social
preferences which rank all options in a given set on the basis of individual preferences over
these options. The theorem states that there is no way to construct social preferences as
a function of individual preferences if this function is required to satisfy basic principles of
unanimity (Weak Pareto: if everybody prefers x to y, so does society), impartiality (Non-
Dictatorship: no individual can always impose his strict preferences) and informational
parsimony (Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives: social preferences over any subset
of alternatives depend only on individual preferences over this subset).
¤First published in Social Choice and Welfare, Vol.24, 2005, pp.311-341. Joint paper with M. Fleur-
baey and K. Tadenuma. This chapter is derived from a part of an earlier draft of our paper entitled
“Informational Requirements for Social Choice in Economic Environments”. Thanks are due to A. Tran-
noy, an associate editor and three referees of Social Choice and Welfare for comments, and participants at
seminars in University of Cergy-Pontoise, University of Rochester, Hitotsubashi University, and Waseda
University, and the 5th International Meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare in Alicante,
Spain. Financial support from the Ministry of Education of Japan through Grant-in-Aid No. 10045010
(“Economic Institutions and Social Norms: Evolution and Transformation”) is gratefully acknowledged.
1For a survey, see Moulin and Thomson [19].
14Impossibilities in social choice theory, possibilities in fair allocation theory — this
contrast requires an explanation. Such an explanation is not only interesting from a
purely theoretical viewpoint, but bears on the ability of social choice theorists to provide
helpful concepts and tools to public economists and decision-makers. The possibility of
social choice is at stake.
The starting point of this chapter is a simple observation. The main explanation
which can be found in the literature is not satisfactory. It says that the theory of social
choice seeks full-ﬂedged orderings of all alternatives, whereas the theory of fair allocation
is satisﬁed with a selection of eﬃcient and equitable allocations in the feasible set. In
other words, Arrow’s impossibility theorem applies to social preferences and does not
apply to allocation rules. The problem with this explanation is that an allocation rule
is formally equivalent to an ordering of all allocations. It is a coarse ordering, with only
two indiﬀerence classes, the “good” and the “bad”. But a coarse ordering is an ordering.
And there is nothing in Arrow’s framework which requires social preferences to have more
than two indiﬀerence classes. Therefore Arrow’s theorem does apply to allocation rules,
and the theory of fair allocation is essentially a part of the theory of social choice.
This simple point raises a question and suggests an answer. The question is: What,
then, is the explanation for the possibility results in fair allocation theory? The answer is:
Allocation rules must violate some of the axioms of Arrow’s theorem. It is indeed a simple
exercise to show that the prominent solutions in the theory of fair allocation, viewed as
social preferences, do violate the axioms of Weak Pareto and of Independence of Irrelevant
Alternatives. It is even quite easy to see why Weak Pareto is violated by allocation rules.
This axiom requires strict social preference in favor of any Pareto-dominating allocation,
and since there are many (chained) instances of Pareto-domination in relevant domains,
it entails that social preferences must have more than two indiﬀerence classes. Allocation
rules can at best satisfy the Pareto-eﬃciency condition (requiring the selected allocations
not to be Pareto-dominated).
In this chapter, we generalize these observations and show why all reasonable (i.e.
minimally impartial) allocation rules in fair allocation theory must also violate the axiom
of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. Moreover, we examine how much weakening
of this axiom (i.e., introducing more information about individual preferences) is required
for a reasonable allocation rule to be possible. In particular, we ﬁnd that less weakening of
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives is needed for allocation rules, thanks to the fact
that Weak Pareto is weakened into the Pareto eﬃciency condition (so as to be compatible
with social preferences having two indiﬀerence classes only), than for social preferences
satisfying Weak Pareto. In other words, there is a trade-oﬀ between Pareto conditions
and independence conditions.
In summary, the main lessons of this chapter are the following. First, the theory of
fair allocation succeeds in obtaining possibility results mainly because it relaxes the axiom
of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. Second, in order to obtain possibility results,
the theory of social choice (with social preferences satisfying Weak Pareto) needs more
information about individual preferences (more weakening of Independence of Irrelevant
Alternatives) than the theory of fair allocation (with coarse social preferences satisfying
15only the Pareto-eﬃciency condition).
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy examines the explanation of the
possibility results in fair allocation theory as given by the literature. This examination
seems in order because, in all fairness, the literature is not as simple-minded as the
above summary suggests. Section 3 presents some simple examples in order to show
how allocation rules can be viewed as social preferences, and what axioms of Arrow’s
theorem they respect or violate. Then Section 4 introduces the model and the main
formal notions. The reason why allocation rules must violate Independence of Irrelevant
Alternatives is studied in Section 5. In Section 6 we then discuss some weak variants of
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, and examine how such variants can be satisﬁed
by allocation rules. Section 7 compares the informational basis of the theory of fair
allocation to that of social choice theory (with Paretian social preferences), delineating
the trade-oﬀ between Pareto conditions and independence conditions. In Section 8 we
come back on the above assertion that the theory of fair allocation is just a part of the
theory of social choice, and discuss various possible uniﬁcations of these theories, and
their relative merits. Section 9 concludes.
2 Explanations from the Literature
Most authors have stressed two diﬀerences between the two theories. The one most often
mentioned is about preferences versus selection. Varian [31] argues as follows:
‘Social [choice] theory asks for too much out of the process in that it asks for
an entire ordering of the various social states (allocations in this case). The
original question asked only for a “good” allocation; there was no requirement
to rank all allocations. The fairness criterion in fact limits itself to answering
the original question. It is limited in that it gives no indication of the merits
of two nonfair allocations, but by restricting itself in this way it allows for a
reasonable solution to the original problem.’ (p. 65)
Similarly, Kolm [17] is ironic about social preferences:
‘The requirement of a social ordering is indeed problematic at ﬁrst sight:
Why would we want to know the 193th best alternative? Only the ﬁrst best
is required for the choice.’ (p. 439)
In his famous survey on social choice theory, Sen [25] also emphasizes this contrast:
‘The speciﬁed subset is seen as good, but there is no claim that they represent
the “best” alternatives, all equally choosable. There is no attempt to give
an answer to the overall problem of social choice, and the exercise is quite
diﬀerent from the speciﬁcation of a social preference over X:’ (p. 1106)
And most recently, Moulin and Thomson [19] have compared the two theories in these
terms:
16‘In social choice theory, the focus is commonly on obtaining a complete rank-
ing of the set of feasible alternatives as a function of the proﬁle of individual
preferences. (...) Consider now the axiomatic investigations of resource allo-
cation. As their counterparts in the theory of cooperative games, their focus
is on the search for allocation rules, no attempt being made at obtaining a
complete ranking of the entire feasible set.’ (p. 104)
The second diﬀerence noticed by these authors is that economic models enable the
analyst to take account of the structure of allocations. Varian mentions only the fact
that the theory of fair allocation can focus on self-centered preferences (individuals being
interested only in their own consumption), while Sen has written about the fairness
literature:
‘First, it has shown the relevance of informational parameters that the tra-
ditional social choice approaches have tended to ignore in the single-minded
concern with individual orderings of complete social states. Comparisons of
diﬀerent persons’ positions within a state have been brought into the calcula-
tion, enlarging the informational basis of social judgments. Second, in raising
rather concrete questions regarding states of aﬀairs, the fairness literature has
pushed social choice theory in the direction of more structure.’ (p. 1111)
Similarly, Moulin and Thomson have argued that
‘the models of resource allocation take full account of the microeconomic
structure of the problems to be solved. (...) This descriptive richness permits
a great deal of ﬂexibility at two levels. First, properties of allocation rules
can be formulated directly in terms of the physical attributes of the economy
(...). Second, the rich mathematical structure of microeconomic models gives
rise to a host of variations on each general principle.’ (p. 105)
However, this second diﬀerence is about additional requirements formulated in a richer
framework, and can hardly explain the relative success of the theory of fair allocation.
This was noted by Moulin and Thomson, who have concluded:
‘Note that social choice theory itself has recently developed in a similar di-
rection, widening its framework by incorporating information about economic
environments (...). But as its objective has remained to obtain complete rank-
ings of sets of feasible alternatives, its conclusions have so far remained largely
negative.’ (ibid.)
Actually, Arrow’s initial presentation of his theorem (Arrow [1, 2]) was already for-
mulated in an economic setting, with self-centered preferences. He indeed considered
the possibility that a more concrete framework, with a domain restricted to standard
consumer preferences, might alter the general outlook of social choice, and he concluded
negatively. This conclusion has been fully conﬁrmed by the more recent research alluded
to by Moulin and Thomson.
All in all, one can safely conclude that the common explanation for the possibility
results in the theory of fair allocation is that it does not seek a full-ﬂedged ordering.
173 Allocation Rules as Social Preferences
As explained in the introduction, an allocation rule, in eﬀect, splits the set of allocations
in two parts, the good and the bad. Even though the intention of particular authors
in this ﬁeld may not have been to give an ordering of allocations, this twofold partition
is, formally, an ordering. Now, in view of the above quotations from the literature,
one may wonder whether the best interpretation of allocation rules is to view them as
partial orderings (quasi-orderings) or as complete orderings. An allocation rule may be
viewed as a partial ordering if the good allocations are deemed non-comparable, and
similarly for the bad ones, as suggested above by Varian and Sen. But this would not
save the thesis that Arrow’s theorem does not apply to allocation rules. Firstly, the social
choice literature has extended the bulk of Arrow’s theorem to quasi-orderings.2 Secondly,
nothing prevents one from deriving a complete ordering from any allocation rule. This
means that the theory of fair allocation is, willy nilly, able to provide complete orderings,
and the puzzle of this success, contrasted to Arrow’s impossibility, remains.
In this section we examine some examples in order to provide more intuition about
how allocation rules can be viewed as social preferences, and as such may be submitted
to the test of Arrow’s axioms. Let us for the moment consider a simple Edgeworth box
setting with two goods and two individuals. Every individual has self-centered preferences
about his own bundles of these two goods. The set of feasible alternatives contains all
allocations for which total consumption does not exceed a ﬁxed available amount of
the two goods. From individual self-centered preferences over bundles one can derive
individual preferences over allocations, simply by considering that an individual prefers
an allocation to another whenever he prefers his own bundle in this allocation to his own
bundle in the other allocation. Therefore we are essentially in a particular version of
Arrow’s framework, with individual preferences over a given set of allocations and the
question is whether one can derive social preferences over this same set of allocations
from any proﬁle of individual preferences.
Arrow’s theorem does apply to such a simple setting, as shown by Bordes, Campbell
and Le Breton [4]. More precisely, they assume that the domain of individual preferences
contains all continuous, strictly monotonic and strictly convex preference relations over
bundles, and study social ordering functions deﬁning a complete ordering for any proﬁle of
preferences. They show that any such function satisfying Weak Pareto and Independence
of Irrelevant Alternatives must be such that one particular individual imposes her own
strict preferences over all interior allocations.3
A prominent solution from the theory of fair allocation, in this simple setting, is the
Egalitarian Walrasian allocation rule, which selects the competitive equilibrium alloca-
2In particular, Weymark [33] has studied the application of Arrow’s axioms to partial orderings, and
obtained oligarchy results. More interestingly, by adding anonymity to the axioms, he characterized the
Pareto partial ordering. Although his results are obtained in an abstract framework with unrestricted
preferences, they strongly suggest that little can be gained by abandoning completeness.
3This is not a full dictator, since this individual is not able to impose her strict preferences over
all allocations. But this result is suﬃciently “dictatorial” to be interpreted as preserving the bulk of
Arrow’s theorem.
18tions with equal budgets. (One may describe it as ﬁrst dividing all available resources
equally among individuals, and then letting them trade in a competitive market.) This
allocation rule deﬁnes simple two-tier social preferences, such that any equal-budget
competitive equilibrium is ranked above any other type of allocation, all equal-budget
competitive equilibria are socially indiﬀerent, and all other allocations are socially indif-
ferent. This is a complete ordering of all the allocations of the relevant set.
Since such an ordering is deﬁned for every proﬁle of individual preferences in the
above domain, one obtains a social ordering function which satisﬁes all requirements of
Arrow’s framework. But it does not satisfy all axioms of Arrow’s theorem, and to this
we now turn.
This social ordering function does not satisfy Weak Pareto, for an obvious reason
already explained above: All non-selected allocations are deemed socially indiﬀerent,
in spite of the fact that some of them Pareto-dominate others. Nonetheless, a weaker
Pareto condition is satisﬁed, since the preferred allocations are never Pareto-dominated
by the other allocations. Pareto-eﬃciency of the selected allocations is indeed the relevant
condition for allocation rules. But it is important to reckon that this is weaker than Weak
Pareto.
More interestingly, this social ordering function does not satisfy Independence of
Irrelevant Alternatives. This is illustrated on Figure 1, which features two allocations,
x and y: Two diﬀerent proﬁles are shown on panel (a) and panel (b). In both proﬁles,
the ﬁrst individual prefers allocation y (since she receives more of both goods in y),
and the other individual has the opposite preferences. By Independence of Irrelevant
Alternatives, the fact that individual preferences about x and y are the same in the
two proﬁles implies that social preferences about the two allocations should be identical
for the two cases. But this is not satisﬁed with the social preferences derived from
the Egalitarian Walrasian allocation rule. Indeed, in panel (a), x is an equal-budget
competitive equilibrium allocation and y is not, so that x is socially preferred to y. The
reverse occurs in panel (b).
It remains to check that there is no dictator with such social preferences. This is again
illustrated in Figure 1, since social preferences go against the ﬁrst individual’s preferences
on panel (a) and against the other’s preferences on panel (b). It is actually easy to
generalize from this example, and see that an allocation rule cannot have a dictator in
Bordes, Campbell and Le Breton’s sense. Indeed, when individual preferences are strictly
monotonic a dictator has ﬁne-grained preferences, which cannot be obeyed by a coarse
social ordering with only two indiﬀerence classes. Therefore, an allocation rule, viewed
as social preferences, always trivially satisﬁes the Non-Dictatorship condition of Arrow’s
theorem.
Let us now consider a second example. Another prominent solution in fair allocation
theory is Pazner and Schmeidler’s [22] Egalitarian-Equivalent allocation rule. This allo-
cation rule selects the Pareto-eﬃcient allocations such that every individual is indiﬀerent
between her own bundle and a common reference bundle which is proportional to the
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Figure 1: The Egalitarian Walrasian Allocation Rule Violates IIA
total available resources. Similarly as above, one can derive two-tier social preferences
from this allocation rule. Again, it does not satisfy Weak Pareto, and does satisfy the
Non-Dictatorship condition, for the same obvious reasons as above. The fact that it does
not satisfy Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives is illustrated in Figure 2. In panel (a),
allocation x is egalitarian-equivalent and allocation y is not, while the reverse holds on
panel (b). By Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, however, social preferences should
be the same in the two cases, since individual preferences about x and y are identical.
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Figure 2: The Egalitarian-Equivalent Allocation Rule Violates IIA
20Figures 1 and 2 provide intuition for the reason why it is unlikely that an allocation
rule, viewed as a social ordering function, will satisfy Independence of Irrelevant Alter-
natives. In these two examples, information about whether any individual prefers x or
y is not suﬃcient to judge how good the allocations are. In the case of the Egalitarian
Walrasian allocation rule, one needs to know at least the marginal rates of substitution at
the relevant bundles. In the case of the Egalitarian-Equivalent allocation rule, one needs
to know the intersection of the relevant indiﬀerence curves with a particular ray in the
space of goods. The next sections study how stringent, in all generality, the Independence
condition is for allocation rules viewed as social ordering functions.
4 Model and Deﬁnitions
Before going to technicalities, let us take stock and see what remains to be clariﬁed.
The previous sections have established the following: 1) the standard explanation for
the possibility results in fair allocation, in view of Arrow’s impossibility theorem, is that
allocation rules are not orderings, so that Arrow’ theorem does not apply to them; 2)
actually, allocation rules do provide complete orderings, so that Arrow’s theorem does
apply to them; the correct explanation must be that allocation rules violate some of
Arrow’s axioms; 3) allocation rules, due to the fact that they yield coarse (two-tier) so-
cial preferences, always violate Weak Pareto and satisfy Non-Dictatorship; 4) prominent
examples of allocation rules violate Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives.
What remains to be seen, at this stage, is whether any reasonable allocation rule
may satisfy Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. What we have to do, therefore, is to
examine the implications, for an allocation rule (viewed as two-tier social preferences), of
satisfying this axiom. For this we must formally deﬁne the concept of an allocation rule,
the concept of social preferences, and, more importantly, the concept of two-tier social
preferences associated to an allocation rule, so that Arrow’s axioms may be correctly
applied to an allocation rule.
4.1 The Model
The model adopted here is just an immediate extension of the simple framework of the
previous section.
The population is ﬁxed. Let N = f1;:::;ng be the set of agents where 2 · n < 1:
There are ` goods indexed by k = 1;:::;` where 2 · ` < 1: Agent i’s consumption bundle
is a vector xi = (xi1;:::;xi`) 2 R`
+: An allocation is denoted x = (x1;:::;xn) 2 Rn`
+ :
A preordering is a reﬂexive and transitive binary relation. Agent i’s preferences are
described by a complete preordering Ri (strict preference Pi; indiﬀerence Ii) on R`
+: A
proﬁle of preferences is denoted R = (R1;:::;Rn): Let R be the set of continuous, convex,
and strictly monotonic preferences over R`
+.
Let ¼ be a bijection on N: For each x 2 Rn`
+ ; deﬁne ¼(x) = (x0
1;:::;x0
n) 2 Rn`
+ by
x0
i = x¼(i) for all i 2 N; and for each R 2 Rn; deﬁne ¼(R) = (R0
1;:::;R0
n) 2 Rn by
R0
i = R¼(i) for all i 2 N. Let Π be the set of all bijections on N.
21There is no production in our model, and the amount of total resources is ﬁxed and
represented by the vector ! 2 R`
++: An allocation x 2 Rn`
+ is feasible if
P
i2N xi · !.4
Let F be the set of all feasible allocations.
For each R 2 Rn, let E(R) denote the set of Pareto-eﬃcient allocations. Because of
strict monotonicity of preferences, there is no need to distinguish Pareto-eﬃciency in the
strong sense and in the weak sense.
A social ordering function (SOF) is a function ¯ R deﬁned on Rn; such that for all
R 2 Rn; ¯ R(R) is a complete preordering on the set of allocations F. Let ¯ P(R) (resp.
¯ I(R)) denote the strict preference (resp. indiﬀerence) relation derived from ¯ R(R).
An allocation rule (AR) is a set-valued mapping S deﬁned on Rn; such that5 for all
R 2 Rn; S(R) is a non-empty subset of F. An AR S is essentially single-valued if all
selected allocations are Pareto-indiﬀerent:
8x;y 2 S(R);8i 2 N; xi Ii yi:
We may now provide precise deﬁnitions for the two ARs informally introduced in
the previous section. The ﬁrst one is the Egalitarian Walrasian AR SW, deﬁned as
follows: x 2 SW(R) if x 2 F and there is p 2 R`
++ such that for all i 2 N;
8y 2 R
`
+; p ¢ y · p ¢
!
n
) xi Ri y:
The second allocation rule is the Pazner-Schmeidler AR SPS; deﬁned by: x 2 SPS(R)
if x 2 E(R) and there is ® 2 R+ such that for all i 2 N;
xi Ii ®!:
With each AR S one can associate the (two-tier) SOF ¯ RS deﬁned as follows: for all
R 2 Rn; and all x;y 2 F;
x ¯ RS(R) y , x 2 S(R) or y = 2 S(R):
One then has: for all R 2 Rn; and all x;y 2 F;
x ¯ PS(R) y , not[y ¯ RS(R) x] , x 2 S(R) and y = 2 S(R):
Conversely, with each SOF ¯ R one can associate the AR S ¯ R deﬁned as follows: for all
R 2 Rn;
S ¯ R(R) = fx 2 F j 8y 2 F; x ¯ R(R) yg:
4Vector inequalities are denoted as usual: ¸;>; and À.
5An alternative deﬁnition of SOFs and ARs makes them a function of ! as well as R. This is useful
when changes in ! are studied, but here we focus only on the information about preferences, and since
! is kept ﬁxed throughout the chapter, we omit this argument.
22Notice that for each AR S,
S ¯ RS = S; 6 (0)
and for each SOF ¯ R that has at most two indiﬀerence classes,
¯ RS ¯ R = ¯ R:7 (0)
Hence, there exists a precise one-to-one correspondence between the class of all ARs and
the class of all SOFs that have at most two indiﬀerence classes. Figure 3 illustrates this
correspondence.
-
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Figure 3: One-to-One Correspondence between ARs and SOFs with at most Two Indif-
ference Classes
What we want to study here is the application of Arrow’s axioms to a particular
class of SOFs, namely, the SOFs that are associated to allocation rules. It is therefore
convenient to give them a special name. Let an “ARSOF” be a SOF that has at most
two indiﬀerence classes, and is therefore associated to an AR. Formally, an ARSOF is a
SOF ¯ R for which there exists an AR S such that ¯ R = ¯ RS:
We will say that an ARSOF is essentially single-valued if its associated AR is essen-
tially single-valued.
4.2 Arrow’s Axioms
We are now ready to give precise deﬁnitions of Arrow’s three conditions.
Weak Pareto: 8R 2 Rn;8x;y 2 F; if 8i 2 N; xiPiyi; then x ¯ P(R)y:
6One has, for all R 2 Rn:
S ¯ RS(R) = fx 2 F j 8y 2 F; x ¯ RS(R) yg
= fx 2 F j 8y 2 F; x 2 S(R) or y = 2 S(R)g
= fx 2 F j 8y 2 S(R); x 2 S(R)g
= fx 2 F j x 2 S(R)g
= S(R):
7One has, for all R 2 Rn and all x;y 2 F:
x ¯ RS ¹ R(R) y , x 2 S ¯ R(R) or y = 2 S ¯ R(R)
, [8z 2 F; x ¯ R(R) z] or [9z 2 F; z ¯ P(R) y]:
In the former case, we obtain x ¯ R(R) y by choosing z = y: In the latter case, y belongs to the lower
indiﬀerence class of ¯ R(R); so that we have x ¯ R(R) y irrespective of whether x belongs to the higher or
lower indiﬀerence class.
23Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA): 8R;R0 2 Rn;8x;y 2 F; if 8i 2 N;
xi Ri yi , xi R
0
i yi
yi Ri xi , yi R
0
i xi;
then x ¯ R(R) y , x ¯ R(R0) y:
In economic domains, it is common to reﬁne the deﬁnition of non-dictatorship so as
to allow for slight strengthenings of the usual axiom. Let X ½ F be given.8
Non-Dictatorship (over X): There does not exist i0 2 N such that:
8R 2 R
n;8x;y 2 X;xi0 Pi0 yi0 ) x ¯ P(R) y:
In addition to these axioms, it will be useful to refer to a full anonymity condition,
which is stronger than Non-Dictatorship but quite appealing on grounds of impartiality:9
Anonymity: 8R 2 Rn;8x;y 2 F;8¼ 2 Π;
x ¯ R(R) y , ¼(x) ¯ R(¼(R)) ¼(y):
4.3 Arrow’s Axioms and Allocation Rules
Our purpose is to examine the implications of Arrow’s axioms for the allocation rules of
fair allocation theory. Arrow’s axioms, as deﬁned above for SOFs, can be applied directly
to ARSOFs, which are just a particular kind of SOFs. But it is quite illuminating to see
the exact constraints the axioms impose on the AR associated to an ARSOF. That is,
one can directly rewrite Arrow’s axioms in terms of the constraints they impose on an
AR. This is just a simple exercise in substituting deﬁnitions, but it appears quite useful
for the intuition. In addition, the obtained formulations are helpful when one comes to
think about weakening the axioms, which will be an important topic in this chapter.
When ¯ R is an ARSOF, x ¯ R(R) y is logically equivalent to [x 2 S ¯ R(R) or y = 2 S ¯ R(R)];
and x ¯ P(R) y is equivalent to [x 2 S ¯ R(R) and y = 2 S ¯ R(R)]: Substituting these expressions,
we obtain the following. The direct translation of Weak Pareto yields:
Weak Pareto (for ARSOF): 8R 2 Rn;8x;y 2 F; if 8i 2 N; xi Pi yi; then x 2 S ¯ R(R)
and y = 2 S ¯ R(R).
Formulated in this way, it is immediate that Weak Pareto is too strong for ARSOFs.
If one takes x;y;z 2 F such that for all i; xi Pi yi Pi zi; the axiom requires y 2 S ¯ R(R)
8For instance, as explained above, the relevant set for the Non-Dictatorship condition may be the set
of interior allocations.
9Notice that the standard “public good” anonymity condition (stating that social preferences should
be invariant to permutations of individual preferences over allocations) would not make sense in the
current “private good” setting, since individual i’s preferences focus on his own bundle. A permutation
of preferences over allocations would mean that he would focus on another individual’s bundle, which is
not permitted in the domain.
24and also y = 2 S ¯ R(R), a contradiction. This was already explained in the introduction.
The standard weakening of this axiom, for applications to ARs, is the following:
Pareto-Eﬃciency (for ARSOF): 8R 2 Rn, 8x;y 2 F, if 8i 2 N, xi Pi yi; then
y = 2 S ¯ R(R).
We are actually more familiar with the following, equivalent, formulation:
Pareto-Eﬃciency (for ARSOF): 8R 2 Rn, S ¯ R(R) µ E(R):
Interestingly, however, this is not the only conceivable weakening of Weak Pareto for
ARSOFs. Another sensible condition, which is logically weaker than Pareto-Eﬃciency,
is the following:
Partial Pareto (for ARSOF): 8R 2 Rn, 8x;y 2 F, if 8i 2 N, xi Pi yi, then x 2 S ¯ R(R)
or y = 2 S ¯ R(R).
This is equivalent to the following condition: 8R 2 Rn, 8x;y 2 F; if 8i 2 N, xi Pi yi;
then y 2 S ¯ R(R) ) x 2 S ¯ R(R): If an ARSOF ¯ R satisﬁes this condition, then for each
R 2 Rn, there exists a subset T µ F such that
S ¯ R(R) ¶
[
y2T
[fyg [ fx 2 F j 8i 2 N; xi Pi yig]:
Pareto-Eﬃciency and Partial Pareto have been introduced in Suzumura [26], under the
denominations of Exclusion Pareto and Inclusion Pareto, respectively. There are inter-
esting ARSOFs satisfying Partial Pareto but not Pareto-Eﬃciency: For instance, deﬁne
S ¯ R(R) ´
n
x 2 F j 8i 2 N; xi Ri
!
n
o
;
i.e., S ¯ R(R) is the set of individually rational allocations from the equal division of re-
sources. This rule satisﬁes Partial Pareto, with T = f(!
n;:::; !
n)g:
Let us now consider IIA. The immediate translation is as follows:
IIA (for ARSOF): 8R;R0 2 Rn; 8x;y 2 F; if 8i 2 N;
xi Ri yi , xi R
0
i yi
yi Ri xi , yi R
0
i xi;
then [x 2 S ¯ R(R) or y = 2 S ¯ R(R)] , [x 2 S ¯ R(R0) or y = 2 S ¯ R(R0)]:
Interestingly, notice that, since SOFs yield complete orderings, the original IIA axiom
can equivalently be written with the conclusion
x ¯ R(R) y , x ¯ R(R
0) y
or the conclusion
x ¯ P(R) y , x ¯ P(R
0) y:
As a consequence, the above IIA for ARSOF could equivalently be concluded by
[x 2 S ¯ R(R) and y = 2 S ¯ R(R)] , [x 2 S ¯ R(R
0) and y = 2 S ¯ R(R
0)];
25which makes it transparent how demanding it is. It requires that if an allocation is
selected while another is not, this does not change when individual preferences rela-
tive to these two allocations remain the same, independently of preferences over other
allocations.
The translation of Non-Dictatorship is as follows. Let X ½ F be given.
Non-Dictatorship (over X) (for ARSOF): There does not exist i0 2 N such that:
8R 2 R
n;8x;y 2 X; xi0 Pi0 yi0 ) x 2 S ¯ R(R) and y = 2 S ¯ R(R):
It is obvious that, as explained in the previous section, this axiom will be trivially
satisﬁed by ARSOFs. For any i0; one can ﬁnd xi0; yi0; zi0 such that xi0 Pi0 yi0 Pi0 zi0; and
if i0 were a dictator, this would imply y 2 S ¯ R(R) and also y = 2 S ¯ R(R); a contradiction.
More interestingly, the Anonymity axiom then boils down to the following simple
standard condition:
Anonymity (for ARSOF): 8¼ 2 Π, 8R 2 Rn, 8x 2 S ¯ R(R); ¼(x) 2 S ¯ R(¼(R)):
5 IIA and Allocation Rules
It is known from Wilson’s theorem (Wilson [34]) that IIA is a very strong axiom. When
applied to allocation rules, the fact that IIA is very strong is captured in the follow-
ing result, which says that it implies that social preferences are totally independent of
individual preferences.
Proposition 1 An ARSOF ¯ R satisﬁes IIA if and only if ¯ R is a constant function.
The proof is based on a simple argument, which may be summarized as follows.
Consider allocation x0 2 F which gives ! to agent i0, and 0 to all other agents. Let
x 2 F be another feasible allocation. Due to the strict monotonicity of preferences,
individual preferences over x and x0 are the same on the whole domain R. Therefore, by
IIA, if x is selected while x0 is not for some R 2 Rn, this must also hold for all R 2 Rn;
and similarly if x0 is selected while x is not.
Proof. It is obvious that a constant ARSOF satisﬁes IIA. For the converse, choose
i0 2 N and deﬁne x0 2 F by x0
i0 = ! (and x0
i = 0 for all i 6= i0). If for all R 2 Rn one
has S ¯ R(R) = F, then S ¯ R is a constant function. Suppose then that this is not the case,
and let R 2 Rn be such that S ¯ R(R) 6= F:
First case: x0 2 S ¯ R(R): Take any y = 2 S ¯ R(R): By monotonicity of preferences, for all
R0 2 Rn;
8i 2 N; x
0
i Ri yi , x
0
i R
0
i yi and yi Ri x
0
i , yi R
0
i x
0
i:
Therefore x0 2 S ¯ R(R0) and y = 2 S ¯ R(R0): The latter implies F nS ¯ R(R) ½ F nS ¯ R(R0): Since
x0 2 S ¯ R(R0), one can show by a symmetrical argument that F n S ¯ R(R0) ½ F n S ¯ R(R)
implying S ¯ R(R0) = S ¯ R(R):
26Second case: x0 = 2 S ¯ R(R): Take any x 2 S ¯ R(R): By monotonicity of preferences, for
all R0 2 Rn;
8i 2 N; x
0
i Ri xi , x
0
i R
0
i xi and xi Ri x
0
i , xi R
0
i x
0
i:
Therefore x0 = 2 S ¯ R(R0) and x 2 S ¯ R(R0): Hence, S ¯ R(R) ½ S ¯ R(R0): Similarly, by a sym-
metrical argument based on x0 = 2 S ¯ R(R0); one can show that S ¯ R(R0) ½ S ¯ R(R):
Contrary to what one might expect, this does not exactly entail an Arrovian impos-
sibility. In fact, there are ARSOFs satisfying IIA and Pareto conditions (and trivially,
Non-Dictatorship).
Let us ﬁrst examine the implication of IIA together with the weakest of our Pareto
conditions, namely Partial Pareto. The message of the following proposition is that even
with the weakest version of the Pareto conditions, under IIA we are not allowed much
room to consider various ARSOFs.
One may get an intuition for the following proposition by considering how an ARSOF
¯ R may satisfy Pareto-Eﬃciency (which is stronger than Partial Pareto) and IIA. By the
previous result, it must be constant. Now, the only allocations which are Pareto-eﬃcient
independently of individual preferences are the allocations like x0 above, in which one
agent receives all of the available resources. With Partial Pareto, a few other possibilities
are permitted. Either one selects only allocations in which one agent receives all of the
available resources, or one must select all of the allocations in which everyone receives
some amount of the resources. Let F ¤ be the set of feasible allocations with no zero
bundle:
F
¤ = fx 2 F j 8i 2 N; xi 6= 0g:
Proposition 2 If an ARSOF ¯ R satisﬁes Partial Pareto and IIA, then either for all
R 2 Rn,
S ¯ R(R) µ fx 2 F j 9i 2 N; xi = !g
or for all R 2 Rn,
F
¤ µ S ¯ R(R):
Proof. Let R 2 Rn be given. Suppose that
S ¯ R(R) * fx 2 F j 9i 2 N; xi = !g;
that is, there exists y 2 S ¯ R(R) such that for all i 2 N, yi < !. We may assume that
y 6= 0. For if y = 0, then there exists y0 2 F such that y0 À 0, and hence for all j 2 N,
y0
j Pj yj. Since ¯ R satisﬁes Partial Pareto, we have y0 2 S ¯ R(R).
Thus, without loss of generality, assume that 0 < y1 < !. We need to show that
F ¤ µ S ¯ R(R).
Step 1: We show that int F ´ fx 2 F j 8i 2 N;xi À 0g µ S ¯ R(R).
Since 0 < y1 < !, there are k;m 2 f1;:::;`g;k 6= m such that y1k > 0 and y1m < !m.
Without loss of generality, assume that y11 > 0 and y12 < !2.
Deﬁne z 2 F as follows:
(1) z11 = 0 and z12 = !2,
27(2) for all i 2 N with i 6= 1, zi1 = yi1 +
y11
n¡1 and zi2 = 0, and
(3) for all j 2 N and all k 2 f1;:::;`g with k 6= 1;2, zik = yik.
Let R0 = (R0
1;:::;R0
n) be the proﬁle of preferences represented by the following utility
functions:
u
0
1(x1) = x12 +
1
r1
X
m6=2
x1m;
8i 2 N; i 6= 1; u
0
i(xi) = xi1 +
1
ri
X
m6=1
xim;
with
r1 >
y11
!2 ¡ y12
8i 2 N; i 6= 1; ri > (n ¡ 1)
yi2
y11
:
Then, for all j 2 N, zj P 0
j yj. Since ¯ R satisﬁes IIA, from Proposition 1, it is a constant
function. Hence, y 2 S ¯ R(R0) = S ¯ R(R). Then, by Partial Pareto, z 2 S ¯ R(R0).
To show that int F µ S ¯ R(R), let t 2 int F. Let R1 = (R1
1;:::;R1
n) be the proﬁle of
preferences represented by the following utility functions:
u
1
1(x1) = x11 +
1
s1
X
m6=1
x1m;
8i 2 N; i 6= 1; u
1
i(xi) = xi2 +
1
si
X
m6=2
xim;
with
s1 >
P
m6=1 (z1m ¡ t1m)
t11
8i 2 N; i 6= 1; si >
P
m6=2 (zim ¡ tim)
ti2
:
For all j 2 N, tj P 1
j zj. Because z 2 S ¯ R(R0) and S ¯ R is constant, we have z 2 S ¯ R(R1).
Then, by Partial Pareto, t 2 S ¯ R(R1). Hence, t 2 S ¯ R(R).
Step 2: We show that F ¤ µ S ¯ R(R).
Let y 2 F ¤. Then, for all i 2 N, yi 6= 0. Let t 2 int F be chosen so that for each
i 2 N, there is k(i) 2 f1;:::;`g such that 0 < tik(i) < yik(i): Let R0 = (R0
1;:::;R0
n) be
the proﬁle of preferences represented by the following utility functions:
ui(xi) = xik(i) +
1
vi
X
m6=k(i)
xim;
with
vi >
P
m6=k(i) (tim ¡ yim)
yik(i) ¡ tik(i)
:
28For all i 2 N, yi P 0
i ti. Because t 2 S ¯ R(R) and S ¯ R is constant, we have t 2 S ¯ R(R0).
Then, by Partial Pareto, y 2 S ¯ R(R0). Hence, since S ¯ R is constant, y 2 S ¯ R(R).
A direct implication of Proposition 2 is that if one requires essential single-valuedness
of an ARSOF ¯ R in addition to Partial Pareto and IIA, then the associated AR S ¯ R must
be the usual “dictatorial” AR considered in the fair allocation literature, namely the AR
which always gives all resources to the same individual. It should then be noted that,
even with the weakest version of the Pareto conditions, which does not require selected
allocations to be Pareto-eﬃcient, IIA and essential single-valuedness together lead us to
the version of “dictatorship” in fair allocation theory. Notice that this “dictatorship” is
diﬀerent from the Arrovian dictatorship as deﬁned in our Non-Dictatorship condition.
A “dictator” in fair allocation theory can impose his strict preferences only for his top
choice in relation to all other alternatives. Again, this is because ARSOFs have at most
two indiﬀerence classes.
Corollary 1 An ARSOF ¯ R satisﬁes Partial Pareto, IIA and is essentially single-valued
if and only if
9i 2 N; 8R 2 R
n; S ¯ R(R) = fx 2 F j xi = !g:
If one requires Pareto-Eﬃciency, which is stronger than Partial Pareto, then, without
requiring essential single-valuedness, one can only get ARSOFs that select allocations in
which someone gets all resources. However, this does not contradict Anonymity. In fact,
together with Anonymity, one gets a full characterization of an ARSOF, as stated in the
following theorem. The ARSOF thus characterized is anonymous in the sense that no
agent is excluded from the chance to get all resources.
Theorem 1 If an ARSOF ¯ R satisﬁes Pareto-Eﬃciency and IIA, then
8R 2 R
n; S ¯ R(R) µ fx 2 F j 9i 2 N; xi = !g:
An ARSOF ¯ R satisﬁes Pareto-Eﬃciency, IIA and Anonymity if and only if
8R 2 R
n; S ¯ R(R) = fx 2 F j 9i 2 N; xi = !g:
Proof. By Proposition 2 and Pareto-Eﬃciency, for all R 2 Rn,
S ¯ R(R) µ fx 2 F j 9i 2 N; xi = !g:
Since ¯ R is a constant, for all R;R0 2 Rn;
fi 2 N j 9x 2 S ¯ R(R); xi = !g = fi 2 N j 9x 2 S ¯ R(R
0); xi = !g:
Therefore Anonymity requires
fi 2 N j 9x 2 S ¯ R(R); xi = !g = N:
29Even though the allocation rule characterized in Theorem 1 above is fully anonymous,
it is not appealing because it selects only extremely unequal allocations. A minimal
requirement of equality is the following:
Equal Treatment of Equals (for ARSOF): 8R 2 Rn; 8x 2 S ¯ R(R); 8i;j 2 N; if
Ri = Rj; then xi Ii xj:
One may notice that any ARSOF ¯ R satisfying Anonymity and essential single-
valuedness necessarily satisﬁes Equal Treatment of Equals.
From Theorem 1 we immediately deduce:
Corollary 2 There is no ARSOF satisfying Pareto-Eﬃciency, IIA and Equal Treatment
of Equals.10 There is no essentially single-valued ARSOF satisfying Pareto-Eﬃciency,
IIA and Anonymity.
Theorem 1 is interesting not only in its content but also in what it implies about all
allocation rules of the fair allocation literature. Since these rules typically satisfy Pareto-
Eﬃciency and Anonymity, and do not give all resources to one individual, they must all
violate IIA. Proposition 1 gave the same conclusion even more immediately, since these
allocation rules are not constant.
More importantly, the analysis in this section reveals that the possibility results of
the theory of fair allocation are not due to the weakening of Weak Pareto into Pareto-
Eﬃciency. Since it is this weakening that allows social preferences to be coarse, this
means that the explanation we are looking for does not lie in the fact that allocation
rules yield only coarse social preferences. The above results show that the only way for
allocation rules to be minimally satisfactory is to violate IIA. Violation of IIA by ARs
is therefore the desired explanation for the contrast between the Arrovian theory of social
choice and the theory of fair allocation.
6 Weakening Independence of Irrelevant Alterna-
tives
At this stage, one may ask in what sense IIA is violated in the theory of fair allocation
or, more precisely, what additional information is taken into account by ARSOFs, that
is forbidden by IIA.
In the theory of social choice, the main approach with respect to information has
been, following Sen [23; 24] in particular, to introduce richer information about utilities.
The theory of fair allocation, in contrast, has remained faithful to Arrow’s initial project
and usually retains only ordinal and interpersonally non-comparable information about
preferences. If it introduces more information, it is about preferences, not about utilities.
That is, preferences about “irrelevant” alternatives are taken into account by ARs.
10A slightly diﬀerent proof obtains by showing that the only constant ARSOF satisfying Equal Treat-
ment of Equals selects the egalitarian allocation giving !=n to every agent, which is not Pareto-eﬃcient
in general.
30It is possible to weaken IIA so as to take account of “irrelevant” alternatives (but
not utilities) by strengthening the premise of the axiom in an appropriate way. This
attempts brings us into several variants of the axiom, which will be introduced now. In
so doing we rely here on previous works by Hansson [15], Fleurbaey and Maniquet [10],
and the companion paper Fleurbaey, Suzumura and Tadenuma [13].
A ﬁrst kind of additional information is contained in the marginal rates of substitution
at the allocations to be compared. For eﬃcient allocations, shadow prices enable one
to compute the relative implicit income shares of diﬀerent agents, thereby potentially
providing a relevant measure of inequalities in the distribution of resources. Therefore,
taking account of marginal rates of substitution is a natural extension of the informational
basis of social choice theory in economic environments. Let C(xi;Ri) denote the cone of
price vectors that support the upper contour set for Ri at xi :
C(xi;Ri) = fp 2 R
` j 8y 2 R
`
+; py = pxi ) xiRiyg:
When preferences Ri are strictly monotonic, one has C(xi;Ri) ½ R`
++ whenever xi À 0:
One then can require the ranking of two allocations to depend on individual prefer-
ences between these two allocations and also on marginal rates of substitution at these
allocations, but on nothing else:
IIA except Marginal Rates of Substitution (IIA-MRS): 8x;y 2 F; 8R;R0 2 Rn;
if 8i 2 N;
xi Ri yi , xi R
0
i yi
yi Ri xi , yi R
0
i xi
C(xi;Ri) = C(xi;R
0
i)
C(yi;Ri) = C(yi;R
0
i);
then x ¯ R(R) y , x ¯ R(R0) y:
Marginal rates of substitution give an inﬁnitesimally local piece of information about
preferences at given allocations. A further extension of the informational basis allows the
SOF to take account of ﬁnite parts of indiﬀerence hypersurfaces. The indiﬀerence sets
are deﬁned as
I(xi;Ri) = fz 2 R
`
+ j z Ii xig:
It is natural to focus on the part of indiﬀerence sets which lies within the feasible set.
However, when considering any pair of allocations, the two allocations may need diﬀerent
amounts of total resources to be feasible and the global set F need not be relevant
in its entirety. Therefore we need to introduce the following notions. The smallest
amount of total resources which makes two allocations x and y feasible can be deﬁned
by !(x;y) = (!1(x;y);:::;!`(x;y)); where for all k 2 f1;:::;`g :
!k(x;y) = max
(
X
i2N
xik;
X
i2N
yik
)
:
31For each vector t 2 R`
+; deﬁne the set Ω(t) ½ R`
+ by
Ω(t) =
©
z 2 R
`
+ j z · t
ª
:
The following axiom captures the idea that the ranking of two allocations should depend
only on the indiﬀerence sets, and on preferences over the minimal subset in which the
two allocations are feasible.
IIA except Indiﬀerence Sets on Feasible Allocations (IIA-ISFA): 8x;y 2 F,
8R;R0 2 Rn, if 8i 2 N;
I(xi;Ri) \ Ω(!(x;y)) = I(xi;R
0
i) \ Ω(!(x;y))
I(yi;Ri) \ Ω(!(x;y)) = I(yi;R
0
i) \ Ω(!(x;y));
then x ¯ R(R) y , x ¯ R(R0) y:
It is immediate from the deﬁnitions that
IIA ) IIA-MRS
+
IIA-ISFA
Notice that IIA-MRS does not imply IIA-ISFA because the set I(xi;Ri)\Ω(!(x;y)) does
not always provide enough information to determine C(xi;Ri):11
It is also worthwhile here introducing a couple of independence conditions for ARs,
which are closely related to IIA and its variants. Such conditions are quite common in
the fair allocation literature. We will formulate them here for ARSOFs.
The ﬁrst one, dealing with marginal rates of substitution, is essentially Nagahisa’s
[20] ‘Local Independence’:12
Independence of Preferences except MRS (IP-MRS): 8x 2 F; 8R;R0 2 Rn; if
8i 2 N;
C(xi;Ri) = C(xi;R
0
i);
then x 2 S ¯ R(R) , x 2 S ¯ R(R0).
The next axiom says that only the parts of indiﬀerence sets concerning feasible allo-
cations should matter.
Independence of Preferences except Indiﬀerence Sets on Feasible Allocations
(IP-ISFA): 8x 2 F; 8R;R0 2 Rn; if 8i 2 N;
I(xi;Ri) \ Ω(!) = I(xi;R
0
i) \ Ω(!);
then x 2 S ¯ R(R) , x 2 S ¯ R(R0).
Although these independence conditions may seem restrictive, they are actually not
really stronger than the previous IIA axioms.
11It does, however, when every good is consumed by at least two agents in x:
12See also Yoshihara [35].
32Proposition 3 On the class of ARSOFs that never select the null allocation 0 =
(0;:::;0), IIA-MRS ) IP-MRS, and IIA-ISFA ) IP-ISFA.
Proof. IIA-MRS ) IP-MRS. Let x 2 S ¯ R(R) and R0 be such that for all i 2 N;
C(xi;R0
i) = C(xi;Ri): Notice that 0 = (0;:::;0) = 2 S ¯ R(R). Since for all i 2 N, C(0;R0
i) =
C(0;Ri) = R`
+, and xi Ri 0 , xi R0
i 0, and 0 Ri xi , 0 R0
i xi, it follows from IIA-MRS
that x 2 S ¯ R(R0) and 0 = 2 S ¯ R(R0).
IIA-ISFA)IP-ISFA. Let x 2 S ¯ R(R) and R0 be such that for all i 2 N, I(xi;Ri) \
Ω(!) = I(xi;R0
i) \ Ω(!). Notice that for all i 2 N, I(0;R0
i) = I(0;Ri) = f0g. Then, by
IIA-ISFA, x 2 S ¯ R(R0).
It is also easy to check that IP-MRS implies IIA-MRS, and that, for ARSOFs which
never select allocations x such that
P
i2N xi 6= !; IP-ISFA implies IIA-ISFA. In other
words, for all practical purposes, the distinction between the IP axioms introduced here
and their IIA counterparts is negligible.
The question we may now consider is how much IIA needs to be weakened, or how
much additional information is needed in order to obtain the existence of a satisfactory
AR (or ARSOF).
Our ﬁrst result is that with IIA-MRS, a possibility is obtained, but there remains
a diﬃculty about essential single-valuedness. As can be expected from the examples in
Section 3, IIA-MRS is satisﬁed by the Egalitarian Walrasian ARSOF ¯ RSW; along with
many good properties. But, as it is well known, the Egalitarian Walrasian AR is not
essentially single-valued. Now, in the proof below we ﬁnd a subdomain on which any
ARSOF satisfying Pareto-Eﬃciency, IIA-MRS and Equal Treatment of Equals coincides
exactly with ¯ RSW on this subdomain, even though ¯ RSW is still not essentially single-valued
on this subdomain.
Theorem 2 There exists an ARSOF satisfying Pareto-Eﬃciency, IIA-MRS, Equal
Treatment of Equals and Anonymity. There is no essentially single-valued ARSOF satis-
fying Pareto-Eﬃciency, IIA-MRS and Equal Treatment of Equals. There is no essentially
single-valued ARSOF satisfying Pareto-Eﬃciency, IIA-MRS and Anonymity.
Proof. The possibility is illustrated by the Egalitarian Walrasian ARSOF ¯ RSW.
The second impossibility is implied by the ﬁrst impossibility because essential single-
valuedness and Anonymity imply Equal Treatment of Equals. To show the ﬁrst impos-
sibility, suppose, to the contrary, that there exists an essentially single-valued ARSOF
¯ R satisfying Pareto-Eﬃciency, IIA-MRS and Equal Treatment of Equals. By Pareto-
Eﬃciency, for all R 2 Rn, 0 = (0;:::;0) = 2 S ¯ R(R). Hence, from Proposition 3, ¯ R
satisﬁes IP-MRS.
Let R¤ be the subset of R such that any R 2 R¤ is representable by a utility function
of the following kind:
u(x1;:::;x`) = f1(x1) + ::: + f`(x`);
where for all k 2 f1;:::;`g; fk is continuous, increasing, concave, and diﬀerentiable over
R++, with limx!0 f0
k(x) = +1. The relevant property of this domain is that for all
33R 2 (R¤)
n ;
E(R) µ fx 2 R
`
+ j 8i 2 N; xi À 0 or xi = 0g:
Let R 2 (R¤)
n be given.
Firstly, suppose that there is x 2 S ¯ R(R) n SW(R). By Pareto-Eﬃciency x 2 E(R).
Hence, we have xi À 0 or xi = 0 for all i 2 N, and by diﬀerentiability of preferences
there is a shadow price vector p 2 R`
++ such that
8i 2 N; C(xi;Ri) = f¸p j ¸ 2 R++g or xi = 0:
For this p; deﬁne Rp 2 R by
8z;z
0 2 R
`
+; z R
p z
0 , p ¢ z ¸ p ¢ z
0:
Let Rp = (Rp;:::;Rp) 2 Rn. By IP-MRS, x 2 S ¯ R(Rp). Since x = 2 SW(R), there exist
i;j 2 N such that xi P p xj, in contradiction to Equal Treatment of Equals. As a
consequence, S ¯ R(R) ½ SW(R):
Secondly, suppose that there is x 2 SW(R) n S ¯ R(R): For all i 2 N; let R0 2 (R¤)
n be
a proﬁle of homothetic (a given R in R¤ is homothetic if all its component functions fk
are homogeneous of the same degree) and strictly convex preferences satisfying
8i 2 N; C(xi;R
0
i) = C(xi;Ri):
We have x 2 SW(R0). Moreover, by Theorem 1 in Eisenberg [7], all allocations in SW(R0)
are Pareto-indiﬀerent. By strict convexity of preferences, one therefore has SW(R0) =
fxg: Since, by the previous argument, S ¯ R(R0) ½ SW(R0); we have S ¯ R(R0) = fxg: By
IP-MRS, x 2 S ¯ R(R); which is a contradiction. Therefore SW(R) ½ S ¯ R(R):
In conclusion, S ¯ R(R) = SW(R) for all R 2 (R¤)
n. But SW is not essentially single-
valued on the whole domain (R¤)
n : This contradicts essential single-valuedness of S ¯ R.
Only with IIA-ISFA do we really obtain a full possibility result, with the Pazner-
Schmeidler ARSOF ¯ RSPS:
Theorem 3 There exists an essentially single-valued ARSOF satisfying Pareto-
Eﬃciency, IIA-ISFA, Anonymity and Equal Treatment of Equals.
Proof. Consider the Pazner-Schmeidler ARSOF ¯ RSPS; deﬁned at the end of subsection
4.1. It obviously satisﬁes Pareto-Eﬃciency, Anonymity and Equal Treatment of Equals.
To check that it satisﬁes IIA-ISFA, let x;y 2 F and R;R0 2 Rn be such that for all
i 2 N;
I(xi;Ri) \ Ω(!(x;y)) = I(xi;R
0
i) \ Ω(!(x;y))
I(yi;Ri) \ Ω(!(x;y)) = I(yi;R
0
i) \ Ω(!(x;y));
and x 2 SPS(R) and y = 2 SPS(R). Let ® 2 R+ be such that for all i 2 N, xi Ii
®!. Then, necessarily ® < 1. Notice that
P
i2N xi = ! because x 2 E(R). Hence,
Ω(!(x;y)) = Ω(!), and ®! 2 Ω(!(x;y)). Together with the above equalities, we deduce
that x 2 SPS(R0) and y = 2 SPS(R0).
347 Under Weak Pareto, Social Ordering Functions
Need More Information
From the previous results, we now know that violation of IIA is crucial for the possibility
results of fair allocation, and that introducing additional information about marginal
rates of substitution is almost suﬃcient, while information about indiﬀerence surfaces
on feasible allocations is fully suﬃcient. Such results are obtained for ARSOFs, that is,
under the condition that social preferences are coarse and satisfy only Pareto-Eﬃciency.
The question we now want to examine is whether SOFs satisfying the full Weak Pareto
condition, and therefore corresponding to ﬁne-grained social preferences, are possible with
the same additional information, or whether they need more information, i.e. further
weakenings of IIA. In other words, is there a trade-oﬀ between Pareto conditions and
independence conditions?
Fleurbaey and Maniquet [10], in this model, showed that there exist many SOFs
satisfying Weak Pareto, Anonymity and the following weak version of IIA:
IIA except Whole Indiﬀerence Sets (IIA-WIS): 8x;y 2 F; 8R;R0 2 Rn; if 8i 2 N;
I(xi;Ri) = I(xi;R
0
i)
I(yi;Ri) = I(yi;R
0
i);
then x ¯ R(R) y , x ¯ R(R0) y:
This axiom is weaker than all IIA axioms considered above, and one may ask what
is the minimal amount of information needed by a SOF in order to satisfy Weak Pareto
and Anonymity (or Non-Dictatorship). In Fleurbaey, Suzumura and Tadenuma [13], we
showed that no SOF ¯ R satisﬁes Weak Pareto, Non-Dictatorship (over the subset X of
allocations in which no agent has a zero bundle), and either IIA-MRS or IIA-ISFA.
But these results were obtained in the particular case of unbounded resources F =
Rn`
+ : The bounded case on which we focus here has attracted less attention in the social
choice literature,13 and here we have the following result.
Theorem 4 There is no SOF ¯ R satisfying Weak Pareto, IIA-MRS and Anonymity.
There is no SOF ¯ R satisfying Weak Pareto, IIA-ISFA and Anonymity.
Proof. For simplicity of exposition, we assume that ! > (20;20;0;:::;0): When this does
not hold, a suitable renormalization of goods allows the rest of the proof to work out.
For each a 2 R`
+, deﬁne
B(a) = fb 2 R
`
+ j max
k2f1;:::;`g
jbk ¡ akj ·
1
10
g
In order to prove the impossibilities, it is convenient to consider diﬀerent possible
sizes of the population.
13Exceptions are Bordes, Campbell and Le Breton [4], already quoted, and also Bone [3].
35Case n = 2: Consider the bundles x = (8;1=2;0;:::); y = (12;1=2;0;:::); z =
(1=2;12;0;:::); w = (1=2;8;0;:::): Let preferences R1 and R2 be deﬁned as follows. On
the subset
S1 = fv 2 R
`
+ j 8i 2 f3;:::;`g;vi = 0 and v2 · min fv1;1gg
one has
v R1 v
0 , v1 + 2v2 ¸ v
0
1 + 2v
0
2;
and on the subset
S2 = fv 2 R
`
+ j 8i 2 f3;:::;`g;vi = 0 and v1 · min fv2;1gg;
one has
v R1 v
0 , 2v1 + v2 ¸ 2v
0
1 + v
0
2:
On B(x) [ B(y), one has
v R1 v
0 , v1 + 2v2 +
` X
k=3
vk ¸ v
0
1 + 2v
0
2 +
` X
k=3
v
0
k;
and on B(z) [ B(w),
v R1 v
0 , 2v1 + v2 +
` X
k=3
vk ¸ 2v
0
1 + v
0
2 +
` X
k=3
v
0
k:
Since
w1 + (1 ¡ w1) + 2[w2 ¡ 2(1 ¡ w1)] > x1 + 2x2
and
2[y1 ¡ 2(1 ¡ y2)] + y2 + (1 ¡ y2) > 2z1 + z2;
it is possible to complete the deﬁnition of R1 such that w P1 x and y P1 z: Then deﬁne
R2 so that it coincides with R1 on S1[S2, and on B(a) for all a 2 fx;y;z;wg. Similarly,
it is possible to complete the deﬁnition of R2 such that x P2 w and z P2 y: Figure 4
illustrates this construction.
If the proﬁle of preferences is R = (R1;R2); by Weak Pareto one has:
(y;x) ¯ P(R) (z;w) and (w;z) ¯ P(R) (x;y):
If the proﬁle of preferences is R0 = (R1;R1); by Anonymity one has:
(y;x) ¯ I(R
0) (x;y) and (w;z) ¯ I(R
0) (z;w):
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Figure 4: Construction of R1 and R2
Since R1 and R2 coincide on S1[S2, and on B(a) for all a 2 fx;y;z;wg, by IIA-MRS
or IIA-ISFA, one has:
(y;x) ¯ I(R
0) (x;y) , (y;x) ¯ I(R) (x;y)
and (w;z) ¯ I(R
0) (z;w) , (w;z) ¯ I(R) (z;w):
By transitivity, one gets (x;y) ¯ P(R) (x;y); which is impossible.
Case n = 3: Consider the bundles x = (8;1=3;0;:::); y = (12;1=3;0;:::); t =
(10;1=3;0;:::); z = (1=3;12;0;:::); w = (1=3;8;0;:::); r = (1=3;10;0;:::): Let prefer-
ences R1, R2 and R3 be deﬁned as above on the subset S1 [ S2, and on B(a) for all
a 2 fx;y;z;wg. Complete their deﬁnition so that y P1 z; w P1 x; t P2 r; z P2 y; x P3 w;
and r P3 t:
If the proﬁle of preferences is R = (R1;R2;R3); by Weak Pareto one has:
(y;t;x) ¯ P(R) (z;r;w) and (w;z;r) ¯ P(R) (x;y;t):
If the proﬁle of preferences is R0 = (R1;R1;R1); by Anonymity one has:
(y;t;x) ¯ I(R
0) (x;y;t) and (w;z;r) ¯ I(R
0) (z;r;w):
Since R1;R2 and R3 coincide on S1 [ S2, and on B(a) for all a 2 fx;y;z;wg, by
IIA-MRS or IIA-ISFA, one has:
(y;t;x) ¯ I(R
0) (x;y;t) , (y;t;x) ¯ I(R) (x;y;t)
and (w;z;r) ¯ I(R
0) (z;r;w) , (w;z;r) ¯ I(R) (z;r;w):
By transitivity, one gets (x;y;t) ¯ P(R) (x;y;t); which is impossible.
37Case n = 2k: Partition the population into k pairs, and construct an argument sim-
ilar to the case n = 2; with the bundles x = (8;1=n;0;:::); y = (12;1=n;0;:::);
z = (1=n;12;0;:::); w = (1=n;8;0;:::); and the allocations (y;x;y;x;:::); (x;y;x;y;:::);
(z;w;z;w;:::) and (w;z;w;z;:::):
Case n = 2k + 1: Partition the population into k ¡ 1 pairs and one triple, and
construct an argument combining the cases n = 2 and n = 3; with the bun-
dles x = (8;1=n;0;:::); y = (12;1=n;0;:::); t = (10;1=n;0;:::); z = (1=n;12;0;:::);
w = (1=n;8;0;:::); r = (1=n;10;0;:::); and the allocations (y;x;y;x;:::;y;t;x);
(x;y;x;y;:::;x;y;t); (z;w;z;w;:::z;r;w) and (w;z;w;z;:::;w;z;r):
This result proves that under Weak Pareto, more information about preferences is
needed than under Pareto-Eﬃciency. In that sense, it is true that the theory of fair
allocation, with its coarse orderings, is less demanding in information than the theory of
social choice.
As explained in Fleurbaey, Suzumura and Tadenuma [13], however, one should not
conclude from this analysis that full knowledge of indiﬀerence curves is needed under
Weak Pareto. Deﬁne the Pazner-Schmeidler SOF ¯ RPS as follows: x ¯ R(R) y if and only
if
min f® 2 R+ j 9i 2 N; ®! Ri xig ¸ min f® 2 R+ j 9i 2 N; ®! Ri yig:
This SOF satisﬁes Weak Pareto and Anonymity, even though it only requires knowledge
of the intersection of indiﬀerence curves with a ray from the origin. In addition, although
this SOF does not satisfy IIA-ISFA in the current framework, it can be shown to satisfy
IIA-ISFA when only allocations of the subset
(
x 2 R
n`
+ j
X
i2N
xi = !
)
with no free disposal, instead of F; are ranked.
8 Toward a Uniﬁed Theory
There have been many attempts to import fairness concepts into social choice, and
thereby build a uniﬁed theory, such as Feldman and Kirman [8], Varian [32], Suzumura
[27; 28; 29] and Tadenuma [30]. But they did not focus on the informational requirements
to obtain positive results.
Our approach provides a uniﬁed framework which covers the theory of social choice
and the theory of fair allocation. Because ARs in the theory of fair allocation are isomor-
phic to ARSOFs in the theory of social choice, and ARSOFs are just a particular kind
of SOF, the concept of SOF is comprehensive enough to encompass all relevant notions.
This shows how the theory of fair allocation is, rigorously, a part of the theory of social
choice.
As a consequence, the way in which possibility results are obtained with ARs, by
broadening the informational basis, can be adopted for SOFs, albeit, as shown above,
38the amount of additional information needed is greater under Weak Pareto. From this
perspective, there is no longer any reason to view the theory of social choice as plagued
with impossibilities, and no longer any reason for social choice theorists to envy fairness
theorists and their positive results. The same recipe for success can be adopted by social
choice theorists.14
In this section we examine two possible objections to this proposed integration of fair
allocation theory into social choice theory. The ﬁrst objection would go by recollecting
that the celebrated Arrow Program of social choice theory consists of two separate steps,
viz., (a) the construction of a social preference ordering corresponding to each proﬁle of
individual preference orderings; and (b) the construction of a social choice function by
means of optimization of social preferences within each set of feasible social alternatives.
The ﬁrst step, which may be called the preference aggregation stage, is to determine
the uniform social objective before the set of feasible social alternatives is revealed. The
second step, which may be called the rational choice stage, is to determine the rational
social choice after the set of feasible social alternatives is revealed. Even though we may
construct a coarse social ordering in terms of the fair allocations versus unfair allocations,
such an ordering hinges squarely on the speciﬁcation of the set of feasible allocations. In
other words, no social preference ordering, which can be applied uniformly to all feasible
sets of alternatives, can thereby be generated. Thus, the objection would go, in view
of the basic scenario of the Arrow Program of social choice theory, the theory of fair
allocation does not really oﬀer much to the preference aggregation stage of social choice
theory.
Our response to this objection is that what is called “social choice theory” in this
paper actually encompasses the preference aggregation stage of the Arrow program, as
presented above, as a special case. We believe that it is quite convenient to see the
common formal structure in all exercises of construction of a preference ordering over a
set of alternatives, whether this set is determined by feasibility constraints or not. In this
paper, the need to compare the social choice approach and the fair allocation approach
has led us to retain
F = fx 2 R
`
+ j x1 + ::: + xn · !g
as the relevant set of alternatives. An orthodox vision of the Arrow Program of social
choice theory might possibly require the construction of the social preference ordering to
be made on the full set Rn`
+ ; rather than F; but we do not think that the construction
of a social preference ordering over F should be excluded from social choice theory for
that reason.15 Moreover, the notion of feasibility itself is multi-faceted. Although F
is determined by some feasibility constraints, the set of actually feasible alternatives, in
practical applications, is likely to be a strict subset of F: For instance, the political system
14For characterizations of SOFs based on fairness axioms, see e.g. Fleurbaey and Maniquet [11; 12].
15Arrow [2] himself was actually vague about the set of alternatives in his monograph on social choice.
For instance, in the economic example he introduces in chapter 6, section 4, he simply states: ‘Suppose
that among the possible alternatives there are three, none of which gives any individual at least as much
of both commodities as any other’ (Arrow [2, p.68]; emphasis added). Bordes, Campbell and Le Breton
[4] study Arrow’s theorem on F as a relevant social choice exercise.
39may give special value to a status quo x0; and restrict attention to another particular
alternative x; introduced as a proposed reform of the status quo. In order to decide
whether x is better than x0 or not, a ﬁne-grained ranking of all members of F is quite
useful, and a ranking of all members of Rn`
+ would be perfectly adequate as well, but
would be more than needed.
The second objection to our uniﬁcation would rely on an alternative way of unifying
the two theories, which has been elegantly formulated in Fishburn [9] and adapted to
economic environments by Le Breton [18]. It consists in broadening the concept of AR,
as done in the theory of social choice based on social decision rules (SDR).
Let F denote the set of non-empty subsets of F; and let A ½ F: A social decision
rule (SDR) is a mapping ¯ S from Rn £ A to F such that for all R 2 Rn; all A 2 A;
¯ S(R;A) ½ A and ¯ S(R;A) 6= ;: Each set A is called an agenda, and A is the class of
agendas.
In this approach, an AR is just a particular kind of SDR for which A = fFg. By
contrast, if A contains all pairs of allocations fx;yg ½ F, one can recover an SOF from
an SDR whenever the SDR satisﬁes a choice consistency condition. The derived SOF ¯ R¯ S
is then deﬁned by:
x ¯ R¯ S(R) y , x 2 ¯ S(R;fx;yg):
In this perspective, the speciﬁcity of the theory of fair allocation is that it has a very
restricted class of agendas. This expresses the fact that the theory of fair allocation only
seeks the good allocations among all feasible ones, whereas the theory of social choice
wants to make ﬁne-grained selections in most conceivable agendas.
The fact that possibility results are obtained in the theory of fair allocation is likely
to be interpreted, in this approach, as due to the restricted agendas, and this reinforces
the usual explanation which opposes ﬁne-grained social preferences and selection. But
this would be a hasty conclusion. Arrow’s independence condition, applied to SDRs, is
formulated as follows in Le Breton [18]:
Independence of Infeasible Alternatives (IIF): 8R;R0 2 Rn; 8A 2 A; if 8i 2 N,
8x;y 2 A : xi Ri yi , xi R
0
i yi;
then ¯ S(R;A) = ¯ S(R0;A).
When the class of agendas is restricted, the amount of information about preferences
that may be used by ¯ S when considering to choose x as against y increases automati-
cally, because the subset A on which preference information is retained becomes larger.
Therefore going to restricted agendas has two consequences. First, it makes one go from
ﬁne-grained preferences to coarse preferences, as emphasized by the usual explanation of
the possibility results in fair allocation theory. Second, and we believe more importantly,
it increases the amount of relevant information about preferences, as delineated by IIF.
And in the limit where A = fFg, the amount of relevant information is maximal. Hence,
in this approach, all ARs are indistinguishable in terms of informational basis since all
have the same maximal basis.
40It is true that in order to identify all the “good” allocations among all feasible allo-
cations, we need anyway to know information about preferences of individuals over the
full set F. However, often in reality, we are faced with a diﬀerent question: Given two
allocations x and y, can we say whether one of the two allocations is good while the
other is not? In fact, ARs can answer this type of questions. For instance, if x is an
egalitarian Walrasian allocation and y is not, one can say that x is good while y is not.
As shown in previous sections, information about preferences necessary to derive such an
evaluation is much diﬀerent among various ARs. For example, the Egalitarian Walrasian
AR only needs knowledge of marginal rates of substitution at the given two allocations
whereas the Pazner-Schmeidler AR needs more global knowledge about indiﬀerence sur-
faces. Such distinctions can be captured by the IIA-MRS axiom, the IIA-ISFA axiom,
and other axioms in the SOF approach developed in this chapter. We are thus inclined to
think that the SOF approach is more suitable to the analysis of the informational basis
of the various theories.16
9 Conclusion
Let us brieﬂy summarize the conclusions of this chapter.
1. The allocation rules from the theory of fair allocation do provide social ordering
functions, so that Arrow’s impossibility theorem of social choice does apply to them.
2. No satisfactory allocation rule satisﬁes Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, so
that violation of this axiom is the explanation for the possibility results in fair
allocation theory, as compared to impossibility results in social choice theory.
3. In the process of weakening the Independence axiom, the introduction of additional
information about marginal rates of substitution or about indiﬀerence surfaces on
possible redistributions of the contemplated allocations is suﬃcient for satisfactory
allocation rules to be obtained.
4. Requiring Weak Pareto, not just Pareto-Eﬃciency, which implies that social pref-
erences must be more ﬁne-grained than allocation rules, makes it necessary to
introduce more information about preferences.
More precisely, the results in this chapter may be summarized as follows:
16The literature does, however, contain some examples of ﬁner informational axioms in the SDR
setting. In an abstract model with a ﬁxed agenda, Denicol` o [5; 6] introduces a pairwise independence
axiom on SDRs in order to obtain impossibility results of the Arrovian sort. This axiom says that if two
proﬁles coincide on fx;yg; and x is selected and y is not under one proﬁle, then y is still not selected
under the other proﬁle.
41Weak Pareto Pareto Eﬃciency
IIA
Arrovian Dictatorship
(Arrow’s Theorem)
ARSOFs giving someone
all resources
(Theorem 1)
IIA-MRS
Violation of Anonymity
(Theorem 4)
Anonymous ARSOFs
with Equal Treatment of Equals
(Theorem 2)
IIA-ISFA
Violation of Anonymity
(Theorem 4)
Essentially single-valued,
anonymous ARSOFs
with Equal Treatment of Equals
(Theorem 3)
IIA-WIS
Anonymous SOFs
(Pazner-Schmeidler [22])
Essentially single-valued,
anonymous ARSOFs
with Equal Treatment of Equals
(Theorem 3)
Table 1: Summary of the Results
As shown clearly by Table 1, weakening Weak Pareto into Pareto Eﬃciency, and there-
fore allowing coarse orderings, alone does not make room for satisfactory ARs. Weak-
ening IIA, and thus expanding informational basis for social evaluation of allocations, is
essential for positive results in fair allocation theory.
However, as is also clear in the table, whether we seek fully Paretian social orderings
or only coarse orderings satisfying Pareto Eﬃciency does make a diﬀerence in how much
expansion of informational basis is indeed necessary beyond what Arrow’s original IIA
allows.
We hope that this chapter, more broadly, contributes to clarifying the informational
foundations in the theory of social choice and in the theory of fair allocation, and also to
clarifying the links and diﬀerences between these two theories. Our proposal for a uniﬁed
theory of social choice, where possibility results from the fairness part can be extended
to SOFs, should shake oﬀ the negative fame of social choice theory.
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45Chapter 7
Ordering Inﬁnite Utility Streams¤
1 Introduction
Treating generations equally is one of the basic principles in the utilitarian tradition of
moral philosophy. As Sidgwick [20, p.414] observes, “the time at which a man exists
cannot aﬀect the value of his happiness from a universal point of view; and [...] the
interests of posterity must concern a utilitarian as much as those of his contemporaries.”
This view, which is formally expressed by the anonymity condition, is also strongly
endorsed by Ramsey [16].
Following Koopmans [14], Diamond [9] establishes that anonymity is incompatible
with the strong Pareto principle when ordering inﬁnite utility streams. Moreover, he
shows that if anonymity is weakened to ﬁnite anonymity — which restricts the appli-
cation of the standard anonymity requirement to situations where utility streams diﬀer
in at most a ﬁnite number of components — and a continuity requirement is added, an
impossibility results again. Hara, Shinotsuka, Suzumura and Xu [12] adapt the well-
known strict transfer principle due to Pigou [15] and Dalton [7] to the inﬁnite-horizon
context. They show that this principle is incompatible with strong Pareto and continuity
even if the social preference is merely required to be acyclical. Basu and Mitra [5] show
that strong Pareto, ﬁnite anonymity and representability by a real-valued function are
incompatible.
Faced with these impossibilities, it seems to us that the most natural assumption to
drop is that of continuity or representability. We view the strong Pareto principle and
ﬁnite anonymity as being on much more solid ground than axioms such as continuity or
representability, especially in the context of the ranking of inﬁnite utility streams where
these conditions may be considered to be overly demanding. Svensson [22] proves that
¤First published in Journal of Economic Theory, Vol.¤, 2006, pp.¤-¤ as a Joint paper with W. Bossert
and Y. Sprumont. We thank Geir Asheim for comments and suggestions on an earlier draft. We are
also grateful to an anonymous referee of Journal of Economic Theory whose helpful comments gave
us an opportunity to improve the paper. Financial support through grants from the Social Sciences
and Humanities Research Council of Canada, the Fonds pour la Formation de Chercheurs et l’Aide ` a
la Recherche of Qu´ ebec, and a Grant-in-Aid for Scientiﬁc Research from the Ministry of Education,
Culture, Sports, Science and Technology of Japan is gratefully acknowledged.
46strong Pareto and ﬁnite anonymity are compatible by showing that any ordering exten-
sion of an inﬁnite-horizon variant of Suppes’ [21] grading principle satisﬁes the required
axioms. The Suppes grading principle is a quasi-ordering that combines the Pareto quasi-
ordering and ﬁnite anonymity. Given Arrow’s [1] version of Szpilrajn’s [23] extension
theorem, this establishes the compatibility result. As noted by Asheim, Buchholz and
Tungodden [2], Svensson’s possibility result is easily converted into a characterization:
ordering extensions of the Suppes grading principles are the only orderings satisfying
strong Pareto and ﬁnite anonymity.
Once the possibility of satisfying these two fundamental axioms is established, an-
other natural question to ask is what orderings satisfy additional desirable properties.
Asheim and Tungodden [3] provide a characterization of an inﬁnite-horizon version of the
leximin principle by adding an equity-preference condition (the inﬁnite-horizon equiva-
lent of Hammond equity; see Hammond [10]) and a preference-continuity property to
strong Pareto and ﬁnite anonymity. An inﬁnite-horizon version of utilitarianism is char-
acterized by Basu and Mitra [6] by adding an information-invariance condition to the two
fundamental axioms. Furthermore, they narrow down the class of inﬁnite-horizon util-
itarian orderings to those resulting from the overtaking criterion (von Weizs¨ acker [24]).
This is accomplished by using a consistency condition in addition to the three axioms
characterizing their utilitarian orderings.
In this chapter, we focus on equity properties. One of the most fundamental equity
properties (if not the most fundamental) is the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle, adapted
to the inﬁnite-horizon framework by Hara, Shinotsuka, Suzumura and Xu [12]. Our ﬁrst
result characterizes all orderings that satisfy strong Pareto, anonymity and the strict
transfer principle. They are extensions of an inﬁnite-horizon formulation of the well-
known generalized Lorenz quasi-ordering (Shorrocks [18]).
In the presence of strong Pareto, the axiom of equity preference (the inﬁnite-horizon
version of Hammond equity) is a strengthening of the strict transfer principle. We use it
to identify a subclass of the class of orderings satisfying the three axioms just mentioned.
These orderings are extensions of a particular inﬁnite-horizon incomplete version of lex-
imin. This second result leaves a larger class of orderings than that identiﬁed by Asheim
and Tungodden [3] because they employ an additional axiom. The relationship between
our leximin characterization and that of Asheim and Tungodden is analogous to the rela-
tionship between Basu and Mitra’s [6] characterizations of inﬁnite-horizon utilitarianism
and of the overtaking criterion.
2 Basic Deﬁnitions
The set of inﬁnite utility streams is X = RN, where R denotes the set of all real numbers
and N denotes the set of all natural numbers. A typical element of X is an inﬁnite-
dimensional vector x = (x1;x2;:::;xn;:::) and, for n 2 N, we write x¡n = (x1;:::;xn)
and x+n = (xn+1;xn+2;:::). The standard interpretation of x 2 X is that of a countably
inﬁnite utility stream where xn is the utility experienced in period n 2 N. Of course,
other interpretations are possible — for example, xn could be the utility of an individual
47in a countably inﬁnite population.
Our notation for vector inequalities on X is as follows. For all x;y 2 X, (i) x ¸ y if
xn ¸ yn for all n 2 N; (ii) x > y if x ¸ y and x 6= y; (iii) x À y if xn > yn for all n 2 N.
For n 2 N and x 2 X, (x
¡n
(1);:::;x
¡n
(n)) is a rank-ordered permutation of x¡n such that
x
¡n
(1) · ::: · x
¡n
(n), ties being broken arbitrarily.
R µ X £ X is a weak preference relation on X with strict preference P(R) and
indiﬀerence relation I(R). A quasi-ordering is a reﬂexive and transitive relation, and
an ordering is a complete quasi-ordering. Analogously, a partial order is an asymmetric
and transitive relation, and a linear order is a complete partial order. Let R and R0 be
relations on X. R0 is an extension of R if R µ R0 and P(R) µ P(R0). If an extension R0
of R is an ordering, we call it an ordering extension of R, and if R0 is an extension of R
that is a linear order, we refer to it as a linear order extension of R.
A ﬁnite permutation of N is a bijection ½:N ! N such that there exists m 2 N
with ½(n) = n for all n 2 N n f1;:::;mg. x½ = (x½(1);x½(2);:::;x½(n);:::) is the ﬁnite
permutation of x 2 X that results from relabelling the components of x in accordance
with the ﬁnite permutation ½.
Two of the most fundamental axioms in this area are the strong Pareto principle and
ﬁnite anonymity, deﬁned as follows.
Strong Pareto: For all x;y 2 X, if x > y, then (x;y) 2 P(R).
Finite anonymity: For all x 2 X and for all ﬁnite permutations ½ of N,
(x
½;x) 2 I(R):
Szpilrajn’s [23] fundamental result establishes that every partial order has a linear
order extension. Arrow [1, p.64] presents a variant of Szpilrajn’s theorem stating that
every quasi-ordering has an ordering extension; see also Hansson [11]. This implies that
the sets of orderings characterized in the theorems of the following sections are non-empty.
3 Transfer-Sensitive Inﬁnite-Horizon Orderings
Now we examine the consequences of adding the strict transfer principle to strong Pareto
and ﬁnite anonymity. A Pigou-Dalton transfer is a transfer of a positive amount of utility
from a better-oﬀ agent to a worse-oﬀ agent so that the relative ranking of the two agents
in the post-transfer utility stream is the same as their relative ranking in the pre-transfer
stream. The strict transfer principle requires that any Pigou-Dalton transfer leads to a
utility stream that is strictly preferred to the pre-transfer stream.
Strict transfer principle: For all x;y 2 X and for all m;n 2 N, if xk = yk for all
k 2 N n fm;ng, ym > xm ¸ xn > yn and xn + xm = yn + ym, then (x;y) 2 P(R).
The strict transfer principle is the natural analogue of the corresponding condition
for ﬁnite streams; see also Hara, Shinotsuka, Suzumura and Xu [12]. An alternative
48(equivalent) formulation of the strict transfer principle involves the explicit expression
of the amount transferred from m to n when moving from y to x (this amount is
± = ym ¡ xm = xn ¡ yn and is readily obtained from our statement of the axiom).
Although this alternative may be more standard in the literature, we use the version
introduced above because it is parallel in structure to the equity-preference axioms to be
deﬁned in the following section.
To deﬁne the class of orderings satisfying the three axioms introduced thus far, we
begin with a statement of Shorrocks’ [18] generalized Lorenz quasi-ordering Rn
g for a soci-
ety consisting of n 2 N individuals. This quasi-ordering generalizes the standard Lorenz
quasi-ordering by extending the relevant dominance criterion to comparisons involving
diﬀerent average (or total) utilities. For all x;y 2 X,
(x
¡n;y
¡n) 2 R
n
g ,
k X
i=1
x
¡n
(i) ¸
k X
i=1
y
¡n
(i) for all k 2 f1;:::;ng:
The relation Rn
G µ X £ X is deﬁned by letting, for all x;y 2 X,
(x;y) 2 R
n
G , (x
¡n;y
¡n) 2 R
n
g and x
+n ¸ y
+n:
Clearly, Rn
G is a quasi-ordering for all n 2 N. The inﬁnite-horizon extension of the
generalized Lorenz quasi-ordering that is of interest in this chapter is deﬁned by RG =
[n2NRn
G. The relation RG can be shown to be a quasi-ordering and we characterize the
class of its ordering extensions in the following theorem.
Theorem 1 An ordering R on X satisﬁes strong Pareto, ﬁnite anonymity and the strict
transfer principle if and only if R is an ordering extension of RG.
Proof. ‘If.’ Step 1. We show that the relations Rn
G and their associated strict preference
relations P(Rn
G) are nested, that is, for all n 2 N,
R
n
G µ R
n+1
G (1)
and
P(R
n
G) µ P(R
n+1
G ): (2)
To prove (1), suppose that (x;y) 2 Rn
G. By deﬁnition, (x¡n;y¡n) 2 Rn
g and x+n ¸ y+n
and, thus,
k X
i=1
x
¡n
(i) ¸
k X
i=1
y
¡n
(i) for all k 2 f1;:::;ng; (3)
xn+1 ¸ yn+1 (4)
and
x
+(n+1) ¸ y
+(n+1): (5)
49Because of (5), it is suﬃcient to prove that
k X
i=1
x
¡(n+1)
(i) ¸
k X
i=1
y
¡(n+1)
(i) for all k 2 f1;:::;n + 1g: (6)
If k = n + 1, we have
n+1 X
i=1
x
¡(n+1)
(i) =
n X
i=1
x
¡n
(i) + xn+1
and
n+1 X
i=1
y
¡(n+1)
(i) =
n X
i=1
y
¡n
(i) + yn+1:
Adding (3) for k = n and (4), we obtain (6) for k = n + 1.
Now let k 2 f1;:::;ng. We distinguish the following four cases which cover all
possibilities.
Case 1. xn+1 ¸ x
¡n
(k) and yn+1 ¸ y
¡n
(k). This implies x
¡(n+1)
(i) = x
¡n
(i) and y
¡(n+1)
(i) = y
¡n
(i)
for all i 2 f1;:::;kg, and (6) for this k follows immediately from (3).
Case 2. xn+1 · x
¡n
(k) and yn+1 · y
¡n
(k). This implies
k X
i=1
x
¡(n+1)
(i) =
k¡1 X
i=1
x
¡n
(i) + xn+1
and
k X
i=1
y
¡(n+1)
(i) =
k¡1 X
i=1
y
¡n
(i) + yn+1:
Adding (3) and (4), we obtain (6) for this k.
Case 3. xn+1 < x
¡n
(k) and yn+1 > y
¡n
(k). This implies
k X
i=1
x
¡(n+1)
(i) =
k¡1 X
i=1
x
¡n
(i) + xn+1
and
k X
i=1
y
¡(n+1)
(i) =
k¡1 X
i=1
y
¡n
(i) + y
¡n
(k):
Combining (4) and the inequality yn+1 > y
¡n
(k) (which is valid by deﬁnition of the present
case), it follows that xn+1 ¸ y
¡n
(k). Adding this inequality and (3), we obtain (6) for this
k.
Case 4. xn+1 > x
¡n
(k) and yn+1 < y
¡n
(k). This implies
k X
i=1
x
¡(n+1)
(i) =
k¡1 X
i=1
x
¡n
(i) + x
¡n
(k)
50and
k X
i=1
y
¡(n+1)
(i) =
k¡1 X
i=1
y
¡n
(i) + yn+1:
The inequality yn+1 < y
¡n
(k) (which is satisﬁed by deﬁnition of the present case) implies
k¡1 X
i=1
y
¡n
(i) + y
¡n
(k) ¸
k¡1 X
i=1
y
¡n
(i) + yn+1:
Combining this inequality with (3) yields (6) for this k.
To establish (2), suppose that (x;y) 2 P(Rn
G). By deﬁnition, at least one of the
following two statements is true:
(x
¡n;y
¡n) 2 P(R
n
g) and x
+n ¸ y
+n; (7)
(x
¡n;y
¡n) 2 R
n
g and x
+n > y
+n: (8)
If (7) is true, it follows that the inequalities in (3) are satisﬁed and at least one of
them is strict. Now (x;y) 2 P(R
n+1
G ) follows from noting that, in all cases distinguished
in the proof of (1), the presence of a strict inequality in (3) yields (6) with at least one
strict inequality.
If (8) is true, it follows as in the proof of (1) that the inequalities in (6) are satisﬁed.
If xn+1 > yn+1, it follows immediately that one of these inequalities must be strict and,
together with x+(n+1) ¸ y+(n+1), we obtain (x;y) 2 P(R
n+1
G ). If xn+1 = yn+1, we must
have x+(n+1) > y+(n+1) which, together with (6), establishes that (x;y) 2 P(R
n+1
G ).
Step 2. We now show that, for all x;y 2 X,
(x;y) 2 P(RG) , 9n 2 N such that (x;y) 2 P(R
n
G): (9)
Suppose ﬁrst that (x;y) 2 P(RG). By deﬁnition, there exists n 2 N such that
(x;y) 2 Rn
G. Moreover, (y;x) 62 Rn
G because otherwise we obtain (y;x) 2 RG by deﬁnition
and thus a contradiction to our hypothesis that (x;y) 2 P(RG). Hence (x;y) 2 P(Rn
G).
Conversely, suppose that there exists n 2 N such that (x;y) 2 P(Rn
G). Suppose there
exists m 2 N such that (y;x) 2 Rm
G. Clearly, m 6= n; otherwise we immediately obtain
a contradiction. If m > n, (x;y) 2 P(Rn
G) and (repeated if necessary) application of (2)
together imply (x;y) 2 P(Rm
G), contradicting the assumption (y;x) 2 Rm
G. If m < n,
(y;x) 2 Rm
G and (repeated if necessary) application of (1) together imply (y;x) 2 Rn
G,
contradicting the hypothesis (x;y) 2 P(Rn
G). We conclude that (x;y) 2 Rn
G and (y;x) 62
Rm
G for all m 2 N. By deﬁnition, this implies (x;y) 2 P(RG).
Step 3. Next, we prove that RG is a quasi-ordering. Reﬂexivity is immediate because,
for all x 2 X, (x;x) 2 Rn
G for all n 2 N and hence (x;x) 2 RG. To prove that RG
is transitive, suppose that (x;y);(y;z) 2 RG. By deﬁnition, there exist m;n 2 N such
that (x;y) 2 Rn
G and (y;z) 2 Rm
G. Let k = max fm;ng. By (repeated if necessary)
application of (1), (x;y);(y;z) 2 Rk
G and by the transitivity of Rk
G, (x;z) 2 Rk
G which, in
turn, implies (x;z) 2 RG.
51Step 4. Now let R be an ordering extension of RG. We complete the proof of the ‘if’
part by showing that R satisﬁes the required axioms.
To establish that strong Pareto is satisﬁed, suppose that x;y 2 X are such that x > y.
Let n = min fm 2 N j xm > ymg. By deﬁnition, (x;y) 2 P(Rn
G). By (9), (x;y) 2 P(RG)
and, because R is an ordering extension of RG, we obtain (x;y) 2 P(R).
Next, we show that ﬁnite anonymity is satisﬁed. Let x 2 X and let ½ be a ﬁnite
permutation of N. By deﬁnition, there exists m 2 N such that ½(n) = n for all n 2
N n f1;:::;mg. By deﬁnition of Rm
G, (x½;x) 2 I(Rm
G). By deﬁnition of RG, this implies
(x½;x) 2 I(RG). Because R is an ordering extension of RG, we obtain (x½;x) 2 I(R).
Finally, we show that the strict transfer principle is satisﬁed. Consider x;y 2 X
and m;n 2 N such that xk = yk for all k 2 N n fm;ng, ym > xm ¸ xn > yn and
xn + xm = yn + ym. Let j = max fm;ng. By deﬁnition of R
j
G, we obtain (x;y) 2 R
j
G.
By (9), (x;y) 2 RG and, because R is an ordering extension of RG, (x;y) 2 R.
‘Only if.’ Suppose R is an ordering on X satisfying the three axioms of the theorem
statement. To prove that R is an ordering extension of RG, we have to establish the set
inclusions RG µ R and P(RG) µ P(R).
Suppose x;y 2 X are such that (x;y) 2 RG. By deﬁnition, there exists n 2 N such
that
k X
i=1
x
¡n
(i) ¸
k X
i=1
y
¡n
(i) for all k 2 f1;:::;ng
and x+n ¸ y+n. By anonymity, we can without loss of generality assume that x
¡n
(i) = xi
and y
¡n
(i) = yi for all i 2 f1;:::;ng. Employing an argument analogous to that used by
Shorrocks [18, Theorem 2], we let w 2 X be such that wj = yj for all j 2 f1;:::;n¡1g,
wn = yn +
Pn
i=1 xi ¡
Pn
i=1 yi and w+n = x+n. We have w ¸ y and thus (w;y) 2 R by
reﬂexivity (if w = y) or by strong Pareto (if w > y). Furthermore, (x¡n;w¡n) 2 Rn
g
and
Pn
i=1 xi =
Pn
i=1 wi. If x¡n = w¡n, (x;w) 2 R follows from reﬂexivity (note that
x+n = w+n by deﬁnition). If x¡n 6= w¡n, it follows that x¡n can be reached from w¡n
through a ﬁnite sequence of Pigou-Dalton transfers (see Hardy, Littlewood and P´ olya
[13]). Thus, by (repeated if necessary) application of the strict transfer principle (and
transitivity if necessary), we obtain (x;w) 2 R (note again that x+n = w+n). Transitivity
now implies (x;y) 2 R.
Now let x;y 2 X be such that (x;y) 2 P(RG). Because P(RG) µ RG by deﬁnition
and RG µ R as just established, it follows that (x;y) 2 R. If (y;x) 2 R, there exists
m 2 N such that (y;x) 2 Rm
G. By (9), there exists n 2 N such that (x;y) 2 P(Rn
G).
We now obtain a contradiction using the same argument as in the proof of (9) and,
thus, the hypothesis (y;x) 2 R must be false. Together with (x;y) 2 R, it follows that
(x;y) 2 P(R).
4 Inﬁnite-Horizon Leximin
An equity property that has received a considerable amount of attention in ﬁnite settings
is the Hammond equity and some of its variations. The inﬁnite-horizon version we use
52is deﬁned as follows.
Equity preference: For all x;y 2 X and for all m;n 2 N, if xk = yk for all k 2 Nnfm;ng
and ym > xm > xn > yn, then (x;y) 2 R.
Equity preference is the extension of Hammond’s [10] equity axiom to the inﬁnite-horizon
environment. The axiom is used in Asheim and Tungodden [3]; see also Asheim, Mitra
and Tungodden [4] for an alternative version which they call the Hammond equity for
the future. A condition which is stronger than Hammond’s equity axiom is used by
d’Aspremont and Gevers [8] who require (x;y) 2 P(R) rather than merely (x;y) 2 R
in the conclusion of the axiom. In the presence of strong Pareto, the two axioms are
equivalent. Moreover, strong Pareto and equity preference together imply the following
property which, in turn, obviously implies the strict transfer principle.
Strict equity preference: For all x;y 2 X and for all m;n 2 N, if xk = yk for all
k 2 N n fm;ng and ym > xm ¸ xn > yn, then (x;y) 2 P(R).
To see that strict equity preference is implied by strong Pareto and equity preference,
suppose that R satisﬁes the ﬁrst two axioms, and let x;y 2 X and m;n 2 N be such that
xk = yk for all k 2 N n fm;ng and ym > xm ¸ xn > yn. Let z 2 X be such that zk =
xk = yk for all k 2 N n fm;ng and xn > zm > zn > yn. By strong Pareto, (x;z) 2 P(R)
and by equity preference, (z;y) 2 R. Thus, transitivity implies (x;y) 2 P(R) and strict
equity preference is satisﬁed.
If the strict transfer principle is replaced by equity preference (which, in the presence
of strong Pareto, is a strengthening), the only remaining orderings are inﬁnite-horizon
versions of the leximin criterion. For each n 2 N, we denote the usual leximin ordering
on Rn by Rn
`, that is, for all x;y 2 X,
(x
¡n;y
¡n) 2 R
n
` , x
¡n is a permutation of y
¡n or there exists m 2 f1;:::;ng such that
x
¡n
(k) = y
¡n
(k) for all k 2 f1;:::;ng n fm;:::;ng and x
¡n
(m) > y
¡n
(m):
Again, let n 2 N and deﬁne a relation Rn
L µ X £ X by letting, for all x;y 2 X,
(x;y) 2 R
n
L , (x
¡n;y
¡n) 2 R
n
` and x
+n ¸ y
+n:
This relation can be shown to be a quasi-ordering for all n 2 N. Finally, let RL = [n2NRn
L.
This relation is a quasi-ordering but it is not complete — some inﬁnite utility streams
are not ranked by RL. Our next result characterizes all ordering extensions of RL.
Theorem 2 An ordering R on X satisﬁes strong Pareto, ﬁnite anonymity and equity
preference if and only if R is an ordering extension of RL.
Proof. ‘If.’ As in the proof of Theorem 1, we begin by showing that the relations Rn
L
and their associated strict preference relations P(Rn
L) are nested, that is, for all n 2 N,
R
n
L µ R
n+1
L (10)
53and
P(R
n
L) µ P(R
n+1
L ): (11)
To prove (10), suppose that (x;y) 2 Rn
L. By deﬁnition, (x¡n;y¡n) 2 Rn
` and x+n ¸
y+n. Then, either x¡n is a permutation of y¡n and x+n ¸ y+n, or there exists j 2
f1;:::;ng such that x
¡n
(k) = y
¡n
(k) for all k 2 f1;:::;ng n fj;:::;ng, x
¡n
(j) > y
¡n
(j) and
x+n ¸ y+n. In both cases, (x¡(n+1);y¡(n+1)) 2 R
n+1
` and x+(n+1) ¸ y+(n+1), that is,
(x;y) 2 R
n+1
L .
To establish (11), suppose that (x;y) 2 P(Rn
L). By deﬁnition, at least one of the
following two statements is true:
(x
¡n;y
¡n) 2 P(R
n
`) and x
+n ¸ y
+n; (12)
(x
¡n;y
¡n) 2 R
n
` and x
+n > y
+n: (13)
By (10), it follows that (x;y) 2 R
n+1
L . To prove that (x;y) 2 P(R
n+1
L ), suppose, by way
of contradiction, that (y;x) 2 R
n+1
L . Then, by deﬁnition,
(x
¡n;y
¡n) 2 I(R
n
`) and x
+n = y
+n;
contradicting (12) and (13).
Using the same arguments as in the proof of (9) in Theorem 1 (replacing RG and Rn
G
with RL and Rn
L), it follows that, for all x;y 2 X,
(x;y) 2 P(RL) , 9n 2 N such that (x;y) 2 P(R
n
L) (14)
and, furthermore, that RL is a quasi-ordering and that any ordering extension of RL
satisﬁes strong Pareto and ﬁnite anonymity.
We complete the proof of the ‘if’ part by showing that any ordering extension R of
RL satisﬁes equity preference. Consider x;y 2 X and m;n 2 N such that xk = yk for all
k 2 N n fm;ng and ym > xm > xn > yn. Let j = max fm;ng. By deﬁnition of R
j
L, we
obtain (x;y) 2 R
j
L. By (14), (x;y) 2 RL and, because R is an ordering extension of RL,
(x;y) 2 R.
‘Only if.’ Suppose R is an ordering on X satisfying the three axioms of the theorem
statement. Fix n 2 N and z 2 X and deﬁne the relation Qn(z) µ Rn £ Rn as follows.
For all x;y 2 X,
(x
¡n;y
¡n) 2 Q
n(z) , ((x
¡n;z
+n);(y
¡n;z
+n)) 2 R:
Qn(z) is an ordering because R is. Furthermore, it is clear that
(x
¡n;y
¡n) 2 P(Q
n(z)) , ((x
¡n;z
+n);(y
¡n;z
+n)) 2 P(R) (15)
for all x;y 2 X. The three axioms imply that Qn(z) must satisfy the n-person versions of
the axioms and, using Hammond’s [10, Theorem 7.2] characterization of n-person leximin
(see also d’Aspremont and Gevers [8, Theorem 5]), it follows that
Q
n(z) = R
n
`: (16)
54Because n and z were chosen arbitrarily, (16) is true for all n 2 N and for any z 2 X.
To prove that R is an ordering extension of RL, we ﬁrst establish the set inclusion
RL µ R. Suppose that x;y 2 X are such that (x;y) 2 RL. By deﬁnition of RL, there
exists n 2 N such that (x;y) 2 Rn
L, that is,
(x
¡n;y
¡n) 2 R
n
` and x
+n ¸ y
+n:
Hence, by (16),
(x
¡n;y
¡n) 2 Q
n(z) and x
+n ¸ y
+n
for all z 2 X. Choosing z = y and using the deﬁnition of Qn(z), it follows that
((x¡n;y+n);(y¡n;y+n)) 2 R. Because x+n ¸ y+n, reﬂexivity (if x+n = y+n) or the con-
junction of strong Pareto and transitivity (if x+n > y+n) implies ((x¡n;x+n);(y¡n;y+n)) =
(x;y) 2 R.
We complete the proof by establishing the set inclusion P(RL) µ P(R). Let x;y 2 X
be such that (x;y) 2 P(RL). By (14), there exists n 2 N such that (x;y) 2 P(Rn
L).
Thus, (12) or (13) is true.
If (12) holds, (16) implies
(x
¡n;y
¡n) 2 P(Q
n(z)) and x
+n ¸ y
+n
for all z 2 X. Setting z = y and using (15), we obtain ((x¡n;y+n);(y¡n;y+n)) 2 P(R)
and, using reﬂexivity or strong Pareto and transitivity as in the proof of the set inclusion
RL µ R, we obtain (x;y) 2 P(R).
If (13) holds, (16) implies
(x
¡n;y
¡n) 2 Q
n(z) and x
+n > y
+n
for all z 2 X. Setting z = y, it follows that ((x¡n;y+n);(y¡n;y+n)) 2 R as a consequence
of the deﬁnition of Qn(z) and, by strong Pareto and transitivity, ((x¡n;x+n);(y¡n;y+n)) =
(x;y) 2 P(R).
5 Concluding Remarks
The results of this chapter reinforce the ﬁndings of earlier contributions regarding the
existence of orderings of inﬁnite utility streams with attractive properties. In particu-
lar, we provide characterizations of two classes of such orderings. Given the existential
nature of the proofs, we do not provide explicit constructions of these orderings. How-
ever, this feature is by no means unique to our approach. Extending quasi-orderings to
orderings often requires non-constructive techniques; see, for example, Richter’s [17] use
of Szpilrajn’s [23] extension theorem in the context of rational choice.
A plausible conclusion to be drawn is that impossibility results such as those of Dia-
mond [9], Basu and Mitra [5] and Hara, Shinotsuka, Suzumura and Xu [12] can be avoided
if continuity or representability assumptions are dispensed with. Because continuity and
55representability can be considered rather demanding in inﬁnite-horizon settings, this con-
ﬁrms, in our view, that the state of aﬀairs in this area is not as disappointing and negative
as has been suggested by the impossibility results of many earlier contributions.
The techniques employed to characterize inﬁnite-horizon versions of the generalized-
Lorenz criterion and of leximin appear to be very powerful and applicable to the extension
of other ﬁnite-population social-choice rules; see also the characterization of inﬁnite-
horizon utilitarianism by Basu and Mitra [6]. We hope that our approach will stimulate
further research in the area of intergenerational social choice by identifying alternative
sets of attractive axioms and characterizing the social orderings that satisfy them.
The classes of orderings characterized in this chapter are relatively large: there are
many comparisons of utility streams that are not determined by the axioms employed.
An issue to be addressed in future work is to examine to what extent the ranking of more
pairs of streams can be determined by employing plausible additional axioms.
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58Chapter 8
Inﬁnite-Horizon Choice Functions¤
1 Introduction
The literature on ranking inﬁnite consumption (or utility) streams has produced a num-
ber of negative results in the form of the incompatibility of seemingly mild axioms. For
example, following Koopmans [15], Diamond [11] establishes that anonymity is incompat-
ible with the strong Pareto principle. Moreover, he shows that if anonymity is weakened
to ﬁnite anonymity — which restricts the application of the standard anonymity require-
ment to situations where utility streams diﬀer in at most a ﬁnite number of components
— and a continuity requirement is added, an impossibility results again. Hara, Shinot-
suka, Suzumura and Xu [14] adapt the well-known strict transfer principle due to Pigou
[17] and Dalton [10] to the inﬁnite-horizon context. They show that this principle is
incompatible with strong Pareto and continuity even if the social preference is merely
required to be acyclical. Basu and Mitra [5] show that strong Pareto, ﬁnite anonymity
and representability by a real-valued function are incompatible. Epstein [12] establishes
the incompatibility of a set of standard axioms and a substitution property requiring the
possibility to improve upon any given constant stream by means of a stream with lower
initial consumption.
The main purpose of this chapter is to suggest an alternative approach that may
provide a promising way to address issues involving intergenerational allocation problems
with an inﬁnite horizon. Instead of searching for a ranking of inﬁnite streams, we examine
a choice-theoretic model where a choice function is used to select a consumption stream
from each set of feasible streams. Because our focus is on the choice-theoretic aspect of
the model, we deliberately consider a simple setting where there is a single resource and
a linear and stationary technology with positive renewal. This implies that the feasibility
of a consumption stream is determined by the initial amount of the resource available,
and the choice function assigns a consumption stream (the chosen consumption stream,
given the feasibility constraint) to each possible initial amount.
We begin with an analysis of two fundamental properties whose versions formulated
for orderings have been used extensively in the literature, namely, eﬃciency and time con-
¤First published in Working paper, University of Montreal. Joint paper with G. Asheim, W. Bossert
and Y. Sprumont.
59sistency. We provide characterizations of all inﬁnite-horizon choice functions satisfying
either of the two axioms and, moreover, identify all choice functions with both properties.
We then consider equity properties that are choice-theoretic versions of the Suppes-Sen
principle, the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle and resource monotonicity (see Asheim and
Tungodden [3]; Bossert, Sprumont and Suzumura [8]; Hara, Shinotsuka, Suzumura and
Xu [14], for equity properties imposed on rankings of inﬁnite streams). Again, classes of
inﬁnite-horizon choice functions possessing one of these properties are characterized, and
further axiomatizations are obtained by adding eﬃciency or time consistency.
The results we obtain are promising. Unlike in the case of orderings of inﬁnite utility
streams, impossibilities can be avoided and rich classes of inﬁnite-horizon choice functions
satisfying several desirable properties do exist. In particular, our choice-theoretic version
of the Suppes-Sen principle imposes full anonymity rather than merely ﬁnite anonymity
and our choice functions may be continuous in the initial endowment. Moreover, it turns
out that the notion of sustainability, which has played a major role in the literature
on intergenerational resource allocation, is closely linked to the Suppes-Sen and Pigou-
Dalton principles. Our conclusion from these results is that the choice-theoretic approach
to intergenerational resource allocation provides an interesting and viable alternative to
the models based on establishing orderings of inﬁnite utility streams, and we propose to
explore this approach further.
Section 2 contains some basic deﬁnitions and a ﬁrst well-known observation charac-
terizing sets of feasible consumption streams. In Section 3, we examine the fundamental
axioms of eﬃciency and time consistency. We characterize all eﬃcient inﬁnite-horizon
choice functions, all time-consistent inﬁnite-horizon choice functions, and the class of
choice functions satisfying both requirements. Section 4 deals with the equity axioms
` a la Suppes-Sen, Pigou-Dalton and resource monotonicity. We characterize all inﬁnite-
horizon choice functions satisfying: (i) Suppes-Sen; (ii) eﬃciency and Pigou-Dalton; (iii)
time consistency and Suppes-Sen; (iv) eﬃciency, time consistency and Pigou-Dalton; (v)
eﬃciency, time consistency and resource monotonicity. As a by-product of our analysis,
we show that the conjunction of eﬃciency and Pigou-Dalton is equivalent to Suppes-Sen.
Section 5 provides some examples and Section 6 concludes.
2 Preliminaries
Let R+ and R++ denote the set of all non-negative real numbers and the set of all positive
real numbers, respectively. Analogously, Z+ and Z++ denote the set of all non-negative
integers and the set of all positive integers, respectively.
The set Y = R
Z+
+ is deﬁned to be the set of all sequences y = (y0;y1;:::;yt;:::).
We interpret y as a consumption stream, where yt is the amount of a single resource
consumed in period t 2 Z+. Time is measured relative to the present: period t is the tth
period after today. The initial amount of the resource is x 2 R+. We assume a linear
and stationary technology, entailing that in each period, the resource is renewed at the
ﬁxed positive rate r 2 R++.
We use the following notation for inequalities in Y. For all y;z 2 Y, y ¸ z if and only
60if yt ¸ zt for all t 2 Z+, and y > z if and only if y ¸ z and y 6= z.
For x 2 R+ and y 2 Y, the sequence of resource stocks
k(x;y) = (k0(x;y);k1(x;y);:::;kt(x;y);:::) 2 R
Z+
generated by x and y is deﬁned by k0(x;y) = x and
kt(x;y) = (1 + r)(kt¡1(x;y) ¡ yt¡1)
for all t 2 Z++. For x 2 R+, the set of x-feasible consumption streams is
S(x) = fy 2 Y j yt 2 [0;kt(x;y)] for all t 2 Z+g:
The following well-known lemma completely characterizes S(x). Because the result
is well-known, we state it without a proof.
Lemma 1 For all x 2 R+,
S(x) =
n
y 2 Y
¯
¯
¯
1 X
t=0
yt
(1 + r)t · x
o
:
3 Eﬃcient and Time-Consistent Choice
An inﬁnite-horizon choice function is a mapping C: R+ ! Y such that C(x) 2 S(x) for
all x 2 R+. This function assigns a consumption stream to any given initial amount of
a single resource available in the economy. Note that consumption streams are undated:
whether the choice takes place today or tomorrow makes no diﬀerence if the same initial
endowment is present. This time-independence feature of a choice function ensures that
the choice of a starting period is irrelevant. It can be motivated in terms of an equal-
treatment property applied to generations. For all t 2 Z+, we write Ct(x) for the tth
component of the sequence C(x).
The ﬁrst fundamental property of an inﬁnite-horizon choice function is the familiar
eﬃciency axiom. It requires that no x-feasible consumption stream Pareto dominates
the chosen consumption stream with initial stock x.
Eﬃciency. For all x 2 R+ and for all y 2 Y,
y > C(x) ) y 62 S(x):
Given Lemma 1, it is straightforward to characterize the class of eﬃcient choice
functions. We omit the immediate proof of the following lemma stating the relevant
result.
Lemma 2 An inﬁnite-horizon choice function C satisﬁes eﬃciency if and only if
1 X
t=0
Ct(x)
(1 + r)t = x for all x 2 R+: (1)
61Time consistency prevents deviations from chosen consumption streams as time pro-
gresses. Thus, for any x 2 R+ and for any t;¿ 2 Z+, the consumption Ct+¿(x) in period
t+¿ for the initial endowment x should be the same as the consumption C¿(kt(x;C(x)))
in period ¿ for the initial endowment kt(x;C(x)).
Time consistency. For all x 2 R+ and for all t;¿ 2 Z+,
Ct+¿(x) = C¿(kt(x;C(x))):
We now characterize all inﬁnite-horizon choice functions satisfying time consistency.
In order to express this class of choice functions, we use a function g: R+ ! R+ that
indicates, for each initial level of the resource, the amount of the resource that is available
in the next period after the present consumption has taken place. Hence, we may refer
to g as the inheritance function. Consequently, g(x)=(1 + r) is the bequest that is left
behind, and x ¡ (g(x)=(1 + r)) is the present consumption. Hence, we may refer to the
mapping x 7! x ¡ (g(x)=(1 + r)) as the consumption function.
For any function g: R+ ! R+, let the function g0: R+ ! R+ be deﬁned by g0(x) =
x for all x 2 R+ and, for all t 2 Z++, deﬁne the function gt: R+ ! R+ by letting
gt(x) = g(gt¡1(x)) for all x 2 R+. As will become clear once our characterization of time
consistency is stated, the functions gt have a natural interpretation: they identify the
amount of the resource available in period t as a function of the initial endowment x only.
Because all these functions are determined once a function g is chosen, it is suﬃcient to
specify, for any initial endowment, the amount of the resource remaining at the beginning
of period one.
The following lemma characterizes all time-consistent choice functions.
Lemma 3 An inﬁnite-horizon choice function C satisﬁes time consistency if and only
if there exists a function g: R+ ! R+ such that
g(x) · x(1 + r) for all x 2 R+ (2)
and
Ct(x) = g
t(x) ¡
gt+1(x)
1 + r
for all t 2 Z+ and for all x 2 R+: (3)
Proof. ‘If.’ Let C be an inﬁnite-horizon choice function and suppose there exists a
function g: R+ ! R+ such that (2) and (3) are satisﬁed. Let x 2 R+ and t 2 Z+. By
(2), it follows that
g
t+1(x) = g(g
t(x)) · g
t(x)(1 + r)
and, together with (3), that
Ct(x) = g
t(x) ¡
gt+1(x)
1 + r
¸ 0:
Using (3) and the deﬁnition of k(x;y), we obtain
kt(x;C(x)) = g
t(x): (4)
62Because g is non-negative-valued, (3) and (4) together imply
Ct(x) = g
t(x) ¡
gt+1(x)
1 + r
= kt(x;C(x)) ¡
gt+1(x)
1 + r
· kt(x;C(x)):
Hence, C(x) 2 S(x) and C is a well-deﬁned inﬁnite-horizon choice function.
To establish time consistency, let x 2 R+ and t;¿ 2 Z+. By (3),
Ct+¿(x) = g
t+¿(x) ¡
gt+¿+1(x)
1 + r
: (5)
By (4) and (3),
C¿(kt(x;C(x))) = C¿(g
t(x)) = g
¿(g
t(x)) ¡
g¿+1(gt(x))
1 + r
= g
t+¿(x) ¡
gt+¿+1(x)
1 + r
which, together with (5), proves that C is time consistent.
‘Only if.’ Suppose C is an inﬁnite-horizon choice function that satisﬁes time consis-
tency. Deﬁne the function g: R+ ! R+ by letting
g(x) = (1 + r)(x ¡ C0(x)) (6)
for all x 2 R+. By feasibility, C0(x) 2 [0;x], and the deﬁnition of g immediately implies
g(x) 2 [0;x(1 + r)] for all x 2 R+, establishing that g indeed maps into R+ and that (2)
is satisﬁed.
It remains to be shown that (3) is satisﬁed. We proceed by induction. Solving (6) for
C0(x), we obtain
C0(x) = x ¡
g(x)
1 + r
= g
0(x) ¡
g1(x)
1 + r
: (7)
Now suppose
Ct(x) = g
t(x) ¡
gt+1(x)
1 + r
(8)
for some t 2 Z+. By deﬁnition, k1(x;C(x)) = (1 + r)(x ¡ C0(x)) = g(x). Thus, using
time consistency and (8), we obtain
Ct+1(x) = Ct(k1(x;C(x)) = Ct(g(x)) = g
t(g(x)) ¡
gt+1(g(x))
1 + r
= g
t+1(x) ¡
gt+2(x)
1 + r
which completes the proof.
We now characterize all inﬁnite-horizon choice functions satisfying both eﬃciency and
time consistency.
Theorem 1 An inﬁnite-horizon choice function C satisﬁes eﬃciency and time consis-
tency if and only if there exists a function g: R+ ! R+ such that (2), (3) and
lim
t!1
gt(x)
(1 + r)t = 0 for all x 2 R+ (9)
are satisﬁed.
63Proof. ‘If.’ Let C be an inﬁnite-horizon choice function and suppose there exists a
function g: R+ ! R+ such that (2), (3) and (9) are satisﬁed. Then, by Lemma 3, C is a
well-deﬁned inﬁnite-horizon choice function that satisﬁes time consistency. Furthermore,
1 X
t=0
Ct(x)
(1 + r)t = x ¡ lim
t!1
gt(x)
(1 + r)t:
By invoking Lemma 2, (9) implies that C satisﬁes eﬃciency.
‘Only if.’ Suppose C is an inﬁnite-horizon choice function that satisﬁes eﬃciency and
time consistency. Then, by Lemma 3, there exists a function g: R+ ! R+ such that (2)
and (3) are satisﬁed. By invoking Lemma 2, eﬃciency and (3) imply that
x =
1 X
t=0
Ct(x)
(1 + r)t = x ¡ lim
t!1
gt(x)
(1 + r)t:
Hence, g satisﬁes (9).
If zero is eliminated as a possible value of the initial amount of the resource, it
is straightforward to obtain a similar result to the above theorem. In that case, the
function g has as its domain and as its range the set R++ rather than R+ and the weak
inequality in (2) is changed to a strict inequality.
Condition (9) is of course a capital value transversality condition, which has been
used to characterize eﬃcient capital accumulation at least since Malinvuad [16].
The properties (2) and (9) of a function g: R+ ! R+ are independent, as is straight-
forward to verify. That (3) must be satisﬁed is a consequence of the time-consistency
requirement, and (2) ensures that this is done without violating the resource constraints.
Property (9) is required for the eﬃciency axiom.
4 Imposing Equity Axioms
We now examine the consequences of imposing certain equity axioms, in addition to
eﬃciency and time consistency.
The ﬁrst of the equity axioms that we consider — Suppes-Sen — requires that no
x-feasible consumption stream has a permutation which Pareto dominates the chosen
consumption stream with initial stock x. The term ‘permutation’ signiﬁes a bijective
mapping ¼ of Z+ onto itself. The Suppes-Sen axiom is a straightforward adaptation of
the Suppes-Sen principle for orderings (cf. Suppes [20]; Sen [19] to the present inﬁnite-
horizon choice-theoretic setting. Clearly, the axiom as deﬁned below implies eﬃciency.
Suppes-Sen. For all x 2 R+ and for all y;y0 2 Y, if y0 is a permutation of y, then
y
0 > C(x) ) y 62 S(x):
Note that we do not restrict the scope of the axiom to ﬁnite permutations (that is,
permutations ¼ with the property that there is a t 2 Z+ such that ¼(¿) = ¿ for all ¿ ¸ t).
64In contrast to the Suppes-Sen axiom formulated for orderings of inﬁnite utility streams,
allowing for inﬁnite permutations does not lead to an impossibility in our choice-theoretic
setting.
Our next result characterizes all choice functions satisfying the Suppes-Sen principle.
Lemma 4 An inﬁnite-horizon choice function C satisﬁes Suppes-Sen if and only if (1)
and
Ct(x) · Ct+1(x) for all x 2 R+ and for all t 2 Z+ (10)
are satisﬁed.
Proof. ‘If.’ Assume (1) and (10) are satisﬁed. Since the sequence h1=(1 + r)tit2Z+ is
decreasing and the sequence hCt(x)it2Z+ is non-decreasing, if y is a permutation of C(x),
then
1 X
t=0
yt
(1 + r)t ¸ x:
Hence, for all y;y0 2 Y such that y0 is a permutation of y, y0 > C(x) implies
1 X
t=0
yt
(1 + r)t > x:
By Lemma 1, y 62 S(x). Thus, C satisﬁes Suppes-Sen.
‘Only if.’ Let x 2 R+. Suppose ﬁrst that
P1
t=0 Ct(x)=(1+r)t < x. Then by Lemma 1,
there exists y 2 S(x) such that y > C(x). Thus, there is an x-feasible consumption stream
which Pareto-dominates the chosen consumption stream with initial stock x, entailing
that C does not satisfy Suppes-Sen. Together with feasibility, this contradiction implies
that we must have
P1
t=0 Ct(x)=(1 + r)t = x. By way of contradiction, suppose there
exists ¿ 2 Z+ such that C¿(x) > C¿+1(x). Construct y 2 Y as follows:
yt =
8
> <
> :
Ct(x) if t 62 f¿;¿ + 1g;
C¿+1(x) if t = ¿;
C¿(x) + r(C¿(x) ¡ C¿+1(x)) if t = ¿ + 1:
Then
1 X
t=0
yt
(1 + r)t =
X
t62f¿;¿+1g
Ct(x)
(1 + r)t +
1
(1 + r)¿
µ
C¿+1(x) +
C¿(x) + r(C¿(x) ¡ C¿+1(x))
1 + r
¶
=
1 X
t=0
Ct(x)
(1 + r)t = x;
implying by Lemma 1 that y 2 S(x). Construct y0 2 Y from y by permuting y¿ and
y¿+1. Since r(C¿(x)¡C¿+1(x)) > 0, we have that y0 > C(x). Thus, there is an x-feasible
consumption stream with a permutation which Pareto-dominates the chosen consumption
stream with initial stock x, entailing that C does not satisfy Suppes-Sen.
65As is apparent from the proof, the Suppes-Sen principle as stated in the theorem can
be replaced with its ﬁnite counterpart, restricting its conclusion to ﬁnite permutations.
In our setting, the two properties are equivalent and we chose to use the general version
in order to illustrate that, unlike the model based on orderings of inﬁnite streams, our
approach does not lead to an impossibility when inﬁnite permutations are permitted.
The second of the equity axioms — Pigou-Dalton — requires that no x-feasible con-
sumption stream can be generated from the chosen consumption stream with initial stock
x through a transfer of consumption from a better-oﬀ to a worse-oﬀ generation. The ax-
iom is a straightforward adaptation of the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle (cf. Pigou [17];
Dalton [10]) for social welfare orderings to the present choice-theoretic setting.
Pigou-Dalton. For all x 2 R+ and for all y;y0 2 Y, if there exist " 2 R++ and ¿;¿0 2 Z+
such that y¿ = y0
¿ ¡ " ¸ y0
¿0 + " = y¿0 and yt = y0
t for all t 2 Z+nf¿;¿0g, then
y
0 = C(x) ) y 62 S(x):
We now characterize all inﬁnite-horizon choice functions satisfying eﬃciency and the
Pigou-Dalton principle. Interestingly, this is the same class as the one identiﬁed in the
previous lemma.
Lemma 5 An inﬁnite-horizon choice function C satisﬁes eﬃciency and Pigou-Dalton if
and only if (1) and (10) are satisﬁed.
Proof. ‘If.’ Assume (1) and (10) are satisﬁed. By Lemma 2, C satisﬁes eﬃciency.
Since the sequence h1=(1 + r)tit2Z+ is decreasing and the sequence hCt(x)it2Z+ is non-
decreasing, if y¿ = C¿(x) ¡ " ¸ C¿0(x) + " = y¿0 for some " 2 R++ and yt = Ct(x) for all
t 2 Z+ n f¿;¿0g, then
1 X
t=0
yt
(1 + r)t > x:
By Lemma 1, y 62 S(x). Thus, C satisﬁes Pigou-Dalton.
‘Only if.’ As in the proof of Lemma 4, we may verify that
P1
t=0 Ct(x) n (1 + r)t = x
must hold.
Now suppose there exists ¿ 2 Z+ such that C¿(x) > C¿+1(x). Construct y 2 Y as
follows:
yt =
8
> <
> :
Ct(x) if t 62 f¿;¿ + 1g;
C¿(x) ¡ " if t = ¿;
C¿+1(x) + " if t = ¿ + 1;
where 0 < " · (C¿(x)¡C¿+1(x))=2, so that y¿ = C¿(x)¡" ¸ C¿+1(x)+" = y¿+1. Then
1 X
t=0
yt
(1 + r)t =
X
t62f¿;¿+1g
Ct(x)
(1 + r)t +
1
(1 + r)¿
µ
C¿(x) ¡ " +
C¿+1(x) + "
1 + r
¶
=
1 X
t=0
Ct(x)
(1 + r)t ¡
r"
(1 + r)¿+1 < x;
66implying by Lemma 1 that y 2 S(x). Thus, an x-feasible consumption stream can be
generated from the chosen consumption stream with initial stock x through a transfer of
consumption from a better-oﬀ to a worse-oﬀ generation, entailing that C does not satisfy
Pigou-Dalton.
The following corollary is an immediate consequence of the previous two lemmas.
Corollary 1 An inﬁnite-horizon choice function C satisﬁes Suppes-Sen if and only if C
satisﬁes eﬃciency and Pigou-Dalton.
The following theorem identiﬁes all choice functions satisfying time consistency in
addition to Suppes-Sen (or, equivalently, in addition to eﬃciency and Pigou-Dalton).
Theorem 2 An inﬁnite-horizon choice function C satisﬁes time consistency and Suppes-
Sen (or eﬃciency, time consistency and Pigou-Dalton) if and only if there exists a func-
tion g: R+ ! R+ such that (2), (3), (9),
x · g(x) for all x 2 R+ (11)
and
x ¡
g(x)
1 + r
· g(x) ¡
g2(x)
1 + r
for all x 2 R+ (12)
are satisﬁed.
Proof. ‘If.’ Suppose there exists a function g: R+ ! R+ such that (2), (3), (9), (11)
and (12) are satisﬁed. By Theorem 1, C satisﬁes time consistency and eﬃciency. Thus,
by Lemma 2, (1) is satisﬁed. By (3) and (12), it follows that
Ct(x) = g
t(x) ¡
gt+1(x)
1 + r
= g
t(x) ¡
g(gt(x))
1 + r
· g(g
t(x)) ¡
g2(gt(x))
1 + r
= g
t+1(x) ¡
gt+2(x)
1 + r
= Ct+1(x)
for all x 2 R+ and for all t 2 Z+. Hence, by Lemma 4, C satisﬁes Suppes-Sen.
‘Only if.’ Assume that C satisﬁes time consistency and Suppes-Sen. By Lemma 4,
(1) and (10) are satisﬁed and, by Lemma 2, C satisﬁes eﬃciency. By Theorem 1, there
exists a function g: R+ ! R+ satisfying (2), (3) and (9).
To show (11), suppose there exists x 2 R+ such that x > g(x). By (3) and (9), it
follows that
1 X
t=0
Ct(x)
(1 + r)t = x > g(x) =
1 X
t=0
Ct+1(x)
(1 + r)t;
contradicting (10).
To show (12), suppose there exists x 2 R+ such that
x ¡
g(x)
1 + r
> g(x) ¡
g2(x)
1 + r
:
67By (3),
C0(x) = x ¡
g(x)
1 + r
> g(x) ¡
g2(x)
1 + r
= C1(x);
again contradicting (10).
Condition (11) ensures sustainable development in the sense that the current con-
sumption can potentially be shared by all future generations. In the context of a station-
ary technology with only one resource (or capital good), this requires that the resource
stock is maintained from the current period to the next, which is just what condition
(11) entails. Condition (12) complements (11) by requiring that the potential for shar-
ing present consumption with future generation actually materializes. Hence, Theorem
2 means that both the Suppes-Sen axiom and the Pigou-Dalton axiom can be used to
justify sustainability in the present choice-theoretic setting.
Theorem 2 thereby echoes similar results when inﬁnite-horizon social choice is ana-
lyzed through social welfare relations.
² In particular, Asheim, Buchholz and Tungodden [2] show how the Suppes-Sen prin-
ciple for social welfare relations can be used to rule out unsustainable consumption
streams as maximal elements under technological conditions satisﬁed by the simple
linear model considered here. This result also implies that social welfare rela-
tions like those considered in Asehim and Tungodden [3], Basu and Mitra [6], and
Bossert, Sprumont and Suzumura [8], which all satisfy the Suppes-Sen principle,
yield sustainable consumption streams as maximal elements as long as maximal
elements exist.
² Asheim [1] shows in a similar way how the Pigou-Dalton principle for social welfare
relations can be used to rule out unsustainable consumption streams.
Another equity axiom that appears to be natural in this context is resource mono-
tonicity. It requires that no one should be worse oﬀ as a consequence of an increase in the
initial level of the resource. See Thomson [21] for a discussion of resource monotonicity
in a variety of economic models and further references. Formulated for inﬁnite-horizon
choice functions, the axiom is deﬁned as follows.
Resource monotonicity. For all x;x0 2 R+,
x > x
0 ) C(x) ¸ C(x
0):
Adding resource monotonicity to eﬃciency and time consistency leads to the choice
functions characterized in the following theorem.
Theorem 3 An inﬁnite-horizon choice function C satisﬁes eﬃciency, time consistency
and resource monotonicity if and only if there exists a function g: R+ ! R+ such that
(2), (3), (9),
g is non-decreasing in x (13)
68and
x 7! x ¡
g(x)
1 + r
is non-decreasing in x (14)
are satisﬁed.
Proof. ‘If.’ Assume that there exists a function g: R+ ! R+ such that (2), (3), (9),
(13) and (14) are satisﬁed. By Theorem 1, C satisﬁes eﬃciency and time consistency.
Let x > x0. By (13), we have that
g
t(x) ¸ g
t(x
0)
for all t 2 Z+. Consequently, since (3) and (14) are satisﬁed, it follows that
Ct(x) = g
t(x) ¡
gt+1(x)
1 + r
= g
t(x) ¡
g(gt(x))
1 + r
¸ g
t(x
0) ¡
g(gt(x0))
1 + r
= g
t(x
0) ¡
gt+1(x0)
1 + r
= Ct(x
0)
for all t 2 Z+. Hence, C satisﬁes resource monotonicity.
‘Only if.’ Assume that C satisﬁes time consistency, eﬃciency and resource mono-
tonicity. By Theorem 1, there exists a function g: R+ ! R+ such that (2), (3) and (9)
are satisﬁed.
To show (13), suppose there exists x;x0 2 R+ such that x > x0, but g(x) < g(x0). By
(3) and (9), it follows that
1 X
t=1
Ct(x)
(1 + r)t¡1 = g(x) < g(x
0) =
1 X
t=1
Ct(x0)
(1 + r)t¡1;
contradicting resource monotonicity.
To show (14), suppose there exists x;x0 2 R+ such that x > x0, but
x ¡
g(x)
1 + r
< x
0 ¡
g(x0)
1 + r
:
By (3),
C0(x) = x ¡
g(x)
1 + r
< x
0 ¡
g(x0)
1 + r
= C0(x
0);
again contradicting resource monotonicity.
Note that the proof of (13) relies on eﬃciency, whereas (14) is established without
using this axiom.
It follows from Theorems 2 and 3 that the classes of choice functions characterized
in Theorem 1 can be narrowed down considerably by adding equity axioms. However,
Suppes-Sen or Pigou-Dalton, on the one hand, and resource monotonicity, on the other
hand, do so in diﬀerent ways.
69² By Theorem 2, Suppes-Sen or eﬃciency and Pigou-Dalton in combination with
time consistency imply that, for given x 2 R+, gt(x) and gt(x) ¡ (gt+1(x)=(1 + r))
are monotone with respect to t, while
² by Theorem 3, resource monotonicity in combination with eﬃciency and time con-
sistency imply that gt(x) and gt(x) ¡ (gt+1(x)=(1 + r)) are monotone with respect
to x for given t 2 Z+.
5 Examples
To ensure that the choice functions in the examples of this section are well-deﬁned, it is
important that the renewal rate r is positive, as we have assumed throughout. Consider
ﬁrst the steady-state example, where consumption is equalized across generations.
Example 1. The inﬁnite-horizon choice function C1 of this example corresponds to the
case in which the function g is the identity mapping, deﬁned by g(x) = x for all x 2 R+.
This implies gt(x) = x for all x 2 R+ and for all t 2 Z+. (2) and (9) are satisﬁed because
g(x) = x · x(1 + r)
and
lim
t!1
gt(x)
(1 + r)t = lim
t!1
x
(1 + r)t = 0
for all x 2 R+. According to (3),
C
1
t (x) = g
t(x) ¡
gt+1(x)
1 + r
= x ¡
x
1 + r
=
xr
1 + r
(15)
for all x 2 R+ and for all t 2 Z+, that is, every generation consumes the same amount.
In addition to satisfying time consistency and eﬃciency, the inﬁnite-horizon choice
function C1 is characterized by a g-function for which the conditions of (11) and (12)
hold with equality. By Theorem 2 this entails that C1 satisﬁes both Suppes-Sen and
Pigou-Dalton. Furthermore, both g(x) and x ¡ (g(x)=(1 + r)) are non-decreasing in x.
Hence, by Theorem 3, the choice function satisﬁes resource monotonicity, as can easily
be veriﬁed directly from (15).
A generalization of the choice function C1 of Example 1 is obtained by letting g be
a linear function such that both g(x) and x ¡ (g(x)=(1 + r)) are non-decreasing in x, so
that resource monotonicity is satisﬁed.
Example 2. The inﬁnite-horizon choice function C2;a of this example is obtained by
letting g(x) = ax for all x 2 R+, where a 2 [0;1 + r] is a parameter. Obviously, the
steady-state case is obtained for a = 1. It follows that gt(x) = atx for all x 2 R+ and for
all t 2 Z+. Clearly, (2) is satisﬁed because
g(x) = ax · x(1 + r)
70for all x 2 R+. (9) is satisﬁed if and only if a < 1 + r because
lim
t!1
gt(x)
(1 + r)t = lim
t!1
atx
(1 + r)t = lim
t!1
³ a
1 + r
´t
x = 0:
Hence, the case where a = 1+r illustrates how (9) can be violated by excessive accumu-
lation of the resource.
Substituting into (3), it follows that
C
2;a
t (x) = g
t(x) ¡
gt+1(x)
1 + r
= a
tx ¡
at+1x
1 + r
=
at(1 + r ¡ a)x
1 + r
(16)
for all x 2 R+ and for all t 2 Z+.
In addition to satisfying eﬃciency and time consistency for a < 1 + r, the inﬁnite-
horizon choice function C2;a is characterized by a g-function for which the conditions of
(11) and (12) hold if and only if a ¸ 1. By Theorem 2 this entails that C2;a satisﬁes
eﬃciency, time consistency, Suppes-Sen and Pigou-Dalton if and only if a 2 [1;1+r). If
a 2 (1;1+r), then consumption is increasing in t, and the consumption of generations t
such that
t >
ln(r) ¡ ln(1 + r ¡ a)
ln(a)
is higher than that of the steady-state, at the expense of earlier generations. Moreover,
the consumption of generation t approaches inﬁnity as t approaches inﬁnity.
Both g(x) and x¡(g(x)=(1+r)) are non-decreasing in x for any a 2 [0;1+r]. Hence,
by Theorem 3, the choice function satisﬁes time consistency, eﬃciency and resource
monotonicity if and only if a 2 [0;1 + r), as can easily be veriﬁed directly from (16).
Therefore, C2;a satisﬁes resource monotonicity, but not Suppes-Sen and Pigou-Dalton,
if and only if a 2 [0;1). If a 2 (0;1), then consumption is decreasing in t, and the
consumption of generations t such that
t <
ln(r) ¡ ln(1 + r ¡ a)
ln(a)
is higher than that of the steady-state, at the expense of later generations. Moreover,
the consumption of generation t approaches zero as t approaches inﬁnity.
Example 2 shows, in the case where a < 1, that gt(x) and gt(x)¡(gt+1(x)=(1+r)) can
be non-decreasing with respect to x, without gt(x) and gt(x) ¡ (gt+1(x)=(1 + r)) being
non-decreasing with respect to t. In particular, a choice function can satisfy resource
monotonicity without satisfying Suppes-Sen and Pigou-Dalton. In the following pair
of examples, we show that a choice function can satisfy Suppes-Sen and Pigou-Dalton
without satisfying resource monotonicity.
Example 3. The inﬁnite-horizon choice function C3 of this example is obtained by
setting r = 1, so that 1 + r = 2, and by letting g be given by:
g(x) =
(
3
2x if 0 · x · 1;
4
3x if x > 1:
71Clearly, (2) is satisﬁed. Also, x · g(x) for all x 2 R+ so that (11) is satisﬁed, and
x ¡ g(x)=2 is an increasing function of x so that (14) is satisﬁed. By combining these
observations we obtain that x ¡ g(x)=2 · g(x) ¡ g2(x)=2 for all x 2 R+ so that (12) is
satisﬁed. Furthermore, if x 2 R++, then C3 behaves as C2;a with a 2 (0;1 + r) when
t goes to inﬁnity, implying that (9) is satisﬁed. If x = 0, then (9) is trivially satisﬁed.
Hence, it follows from Theorem 2 that the inﬁnite-horizon choice function C3 satisﬁes
eﬃciency, time consistency, Suppes-Sen and Pigou-Dalton. However,
g(1) = 3
2 > 17
12 = g
¡
17
16
¢
:
Hence, (13) does not hold, and it follows from Theorem 3 that C3 does not satisfy resource
monotonicity.
Example 4. The inﬁnite-horizon choice function C4 of this example is obtained by
setting r = 1, so that 1 + r = 2, and by letting g be given by:
g(x) =
(
4
3x if 0 · x · 1;
3
2x if x > 1:
Clearly, (2) is satisﬁed. Also, x · g(x) for all x 2 R+ so that (11) is satisﬁed, and g(x)
is an increasing function of x so that (13) is satisﬁed. Furthermore, if x 2 R++, then C4
behaves as C2;a with a 2 (0;1 + r) when t goes to inﬁnity, implying that (9) is satisﬁed.
If x = 0, then (9) is trivially satisﬁed. To verify that (12) is satisﬁed, note that
x ¡
g(x)
2 =
¡
1 ¡ 2
3
¢
x = 1
3x · 4
9x =
¡
4
3 ¡ 8
9
¢
x = g(x) ¡
g2(x)
2 if 0 · x · 3
4;
x ¡
g(x)
2 =
¡
1 ¡ 2
3
¢
x = 1
3x = 1
3x =
¡
4
3 ¡ 1
¢
x = g(x) ¡
g2(x)
2 if 4
3 < x · 1;
x ¡
g(x)
2 =
¡
1 ¡ 3
4
¢
x = 1
4x · 3
8x =
¡
3
2 ¡ 9
8
¢
x = g(x) ¡
g2(x)
2 if x > 1:
Hence, it follows from Theorem 2 that the inﬁnite-horizon choice function C4 satisﬁes
eﬃciency, time consistency, Suppes-Sen and Pigou-Dalton. However,
1 ¡
g(1)
2 = 1 ¡ 2
3 = 1
3 > 5
18 = 10
9 ¡ 5
6 = 10
9 ¡
g(10=9)
2 :
Hence, (14) does not hold, and it follows from Theorem 3 that C4 does not satisfy resource
monotonicity.
Examples 2, 3 and 4 show that the conditions characterizing Suppes-Sen and Pigou-
Dalton — namely that gt(x) and gt(x) ¡ gt+1(x)=(1 + r) are monotone with respect to
t — are independent of the conditions characterizing resource monotonicity — namely
that gt(x) and gt(x) ¡ gt+1(x)=(1 + r) are monotone with respect to x.
We conclude with an example showing that condition (13) is not necessary for an
inﬁnite-horizon choice function to satisfy time consistency and resource monotonicity, as
long as eﬃciency is not imposed.
72Example 5. The inﬁnite-horizon choice function C5 of this example is obtained by
setting r = 1, so that 1 + r = 2, and by letting g be given by:
g(x) =
(
2x if 0 · x · 1;
2(x ¡ 1
2) if x > 1:
Clearly (2) is satisﬁed, while condition (13) is not satisﬁed, since
g(1) = 2 > 3
2 = g
¡
5
4
¢
:
Resource monotonicity still holds since, by substituting into (3), it follows that
C
5(x) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
(0;0;:::) if x = 0;
¡
0;:::;0 | {z }
n+1 times
; 1
2; 1
2;:::
¢
if x 2
¡
(1
2)n+1;(1
2)n¤
for n 2 Z+;
¡
1
2; 1
2;:::
¢
if x > 1:
It is straightforward to verify that C5 does not satisfy eﬃciency; in particular, increas-
ing the initial resource stock beyond x does not lead to increased consumption for any
generation, provided that x > 1.
Examples 1 and 2 provide inﬁnite-horizon choice functions that are continuous in
the initial endowment, even though there are no continuous orderings satisfying strong
Pareto and ﬁnite anonymity that rationalize them. This observation serves to further
underline the gains that are possible from adopting a choice-theoretic approach.
6 Concluding Remarks
We conclude this chapter with some thoughts on possible directions where the approach
of this chapter might be taken in future work. An issue that suggests itself naturally when
considering a choice function is its rationalizability by a relation deﬁned on the objects
of choice — in our case, inﬁnite consumption streams. The rationalizability of choice
functions with arbitrary domains has been examined thoroughly in contributions such as
Richter [18] and Hansson [13] and, more recently, Bossert, Sprumont and Suzumura [7]
and Bossert and Suzumura [9]. While the generality of the results obtained in these papers
allow for their application in our intergenerational setting, it might be possible to obtain
new observations due to the speciﬁc structure of the domain considered here. Note that
the existence of a rationalizing ordering does not conﬂict with the impossibility results
established for such orderings in the earlier literature: the existence of a rationalization
of an inﬁnite-horizon choice function satisfying requirements such as Suppes-Sen does not
imply that the choice function is rationalizable by an ordering that possesses properties
such as the Suppes-Sen principle formulated for binary relations.
As mentioned earlier, we made the conscious choice to work with a simple model
in order to emphasize the novel aspect of the chapter — the choice-theoretic approach
in an inﬁnite-horizon setting. It might turn out to be of interest to explore possible
generalizations in future work.
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